

Abstracts, Alphabetical

Author(s): Ben Almassi

Title: After Epistemic Injustice...Epistemic Repair? Margaret Urban Walker, Reparative Justice, and the Intersection of Feminist Ethics and Epistemology

Abstract: “Recent work by feminist epistemologists and philosophers of science has carefully mapped the varieties and contours of epistemic injustice, including credibility deficits (Fricker 2007), willful hermeneutical ignorance (Pohlhaus 2012), gender-based (dis)trust (Rolin 2002), testimonial smothering, silencing, and other such epistemic violence (Dotson 2011). I suggest that this work might be fruitfully supplemented by bridging the divide between feminist epistemology and ethics, specifically by extending Margaret Urban Walker’s work on moral repair and reparative justice from its initial focus on non-ideal moral contexts to include non-ideal epistemic contexts. Walker offers a valuable tool for understanding and enacting what’s needed to restore moral relationships in the aftermath of human injustice and wrongdoing large and small. Her main emphasis is on the prospects for restoring the conditions for a healthy moral relationship, which means “restoring or creating trust and hope in a shared sense of value and responsibility” (Walker 2006).

Ideally we’d never do ourselves or each other wrong; but given that we do, as fallible and imperfect moral agents we need non-ideal ethical guidance for how to proceed after wrongdoing. I propose to extend these non-ideal theoretical and practical guidelines to the question of how to proceed after epistemic injustices. My paper, then, is composed of two main parts. First, I describe Walker’s model of reparative justice and its extension to include contexts of epistemic injustice, with specific attention to the aftermath of gender- and race-based epistemic violence. Second, I identify some theoretical and practical virtues and problems for a Walker-style model of epistemic repair, including problems of victim identification and of unwanted amends.

Author(s): Derek Anderson

Title: Against Logical Tolerance: On The Limits of Conceptual Ethics

Abstract: “Many philosophers (following Carnap 1937) endorse a principle of logical tolerance. According to the principle of logical tolerance, each person is free to use linguistic expressions however they choose; all that is required is that they provide an explicit and exact definition. We are free to stipulate which concepts are expressed by our words. The principle of logical tolerance has given rise to the field of conceptual ethics (c.f. Burgess & Plunket 2013) opening the door to ethical questions about which concepts we should use to think and talk about the world.

I argue that in most (if not all) domains in which questions of conceptual ethics might arise, the principle of logical tolerance is false. We are not free to choose which concepts our words express when those words feature in social, political, and ethical discourse. My argument centers on a discussion of the semantics of the word “racist”. I argue that individual people are not free to decide for themselves what ‘their’ word “racist” means. It is impossible, for example, for a person to correctly regard the sentence “black people can be racist against white people” as part of an analytic definition of their own term “racist” in their own private language.

I defend this position on both ethical and logical grounds. I argue that to adopt the principle of logical tolerance regarding the term “racist” is morally wrong, since it constitutes epistemic oppression against people of color. Then, I argue that Carnap’s principle of tolerance is only logically defensible in the domain of pure logical syntax—a fact that Carnap himself originally stated. Hence, there is no purely logical reason to think that we are individually free to choose the semantic properties of public natural language expressions.”

Author(s): Alison Bailey

Title: On Anger and Epistemic Injustice

Abstract: “Anger is the emotion of injustice. Members of disenfranchised groups have historically defended our anger as a morally and politically appropriate response to intersecting forms of institutionalized oppressions that we have had to navigate, for centuries, with a numbing degree of regularity.

In this paper I want to explore more deeply the relationship between anger and a particular expression of injustice-- epistemic injustice. Miranda Fricker’s *Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing* (2007) explores the “idea that there is a distinctively epistemic kind of injustice,” and that there are a number of phenomena that might be categorized under the general heading of epistemic injustice (2007, 1). Yet for all of her careful attention to naming and unpacking the injustices present in many of our epistemic interactions, she fails to discuss anger. Indeed the word never appears in her book.

I suggest two reasons for Fricker’s failure to do consider anger as an epistemic resource: (1) I argue that her hearer-centered account of epistemic virtue creates a dyadic relationship and an emotional distance between listeners and speakers, and (2) that she fails to seriously flesh out the power of affective resources for epistemic justice.

My project, however, is neither to rescue Fricker from this criticism, nor to fill in the gaps of her account. There is knowledge in anger. Anger is an important epistemic resource. Anger can boost epistemic confidence. As such, I argue that it offers speakers a powerful resource for responding to epistemic injustice. Anger does things. It offers us epistemic friction. I close with an extended account of the ways in which members of marginalized groups, in particular women of color, have readily used anger as resource against injustice, epistemic or otherwise.”

Author(s): Ramon Barthelemy

Title: LGBT Climate in Physics

Abstract: The issue of representation and climate for women and people of colors have been largely discussed in the physics community. However, conversations about LGBT (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender) physicists have been absent until now. In March 2015 the American Physical Society released the “LGBT Climate in Physics” report highlighting the concerns of and barriers faced by LGBT Physicists. Findings indicated that experience and observation of harassment was common, and much higher for women (31%), transgender persons (49%), and gender non-conforming persons (42%). The report made simple recommendations to address harassment and other concerns such as

creating a formal mechanism for reporting, improving LGBT visibility in the physics community, and more.

Author(s): Nora Berenstain

Title: Active Ignorance and Defenses of Biological Race Science

Abstract: “An insight of much work in feminist epistemologies and epistemologies of race is that ignorance may be active rather than merely passive. Tuana (2004) notes, “Ignorance is frequently constructed and actively preserved, and is linked to issues of cognitive authority, doubt, trust, silencing, and uncertainty.” The production of ignorance has political dimensions related to who gets seen as possessing credibility, competence, and expertise and what questions are viewed as worthy of pursuit. Mills (2007) identifies white ignorance as an actively maintained form of ignorance that masquerades as knowledge and goes hand-in-hand with tacit acceptance of the racial contract of white supremacy. The racial contract of white supremacy prescribes and demands “white misunderstanding, misrepresentation, evasion, and self-deception on matters related to race” (Mills 1997, 18). Pohlhaus (2012) develops the concept of willful hermeneutical ignorance and argues that, when dominantly situated knowers have access to epistemic resources created from the experiences of marginalized knowers and they pre-emptively dismiss these resources out of hand, they are accountable for their ignorance.

I employ Mills’s concept of white ignorance and other insights from epistemologies of ignorance to the construction of contemporary philosophical defenses of biological race science investigations, such as (Anomaly 2014; Haidt 2009; Pinker 2006a, 2006b). I argue that the production of ignorance surrounding biological race science can be seen as actively cultivated by dominantly situated scholars, who use rhetorical tools to paint critics of race science investigations as premature, authoritarian, and motivated by purely moral concerns. These strategies include deflecting, reorienting the discussion about free speech and censorship, and avoiding engagement with empirical criticisms of the actual science. I pay special attention to the role that philosophers play in producing defenses of contemporary race research and to the rhetorical devices they use to construct these investigations in the image of rationality and objectivity. An insight of much work in feminist epistemologies and epistemologies of race is that ignorance may be active rather than merely passive. Tuana (2004) notes, “Ignorance is frequently constructed and actively preserved, and is linked to issues of cognitive authority, doubt, trust, silencing, and uncertainty.” The production of ignorance has political dimensions related to who gets seen as possessing credibility, competence, and expertise and what questions are viewed as worthy of pursuit. Mills (2007) identifies white ignorance as an actively maintained form of ignorance that masquerades as knowledge and goes hand-in-hand with tacit acceptance of the racial contract of white supremacy. The racial contract of white supremacy prescribes and demands “white misunderstanding, misrepresentation, evasion, and self-deception on matters related to race” (Mills 1997, 18). Pohlhaus (2012) develops the concept of willful hermeneutical ignorance and argues that, when dominantly situated knowers have access to epistemic resources created from the experiences of marginalized knowers and they pre-emptively dismiss these resources out of hand, they are accountable for their ignorance.

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Author(s): Emily Bingeman

Title: Ability, Disability and the Ethics of Everyday Knowledge Practice

Abstract: "The social model of disability has been influential in shaping the discourse around disability rights and has received attention in feminist work in ethics, politics and social ontology. However, little work has been done to explore how the social model of disability might illuminate epistemic practice. In this paper I argue that the social model of disability provides useful tools for exploring the interconnections between our epistemic and our ethical practices.

In particular, this paper focuses on interrogating notions of ability/disability in a new trend in analytic social epistemology referred to as "value-driven epistemology." Many value-driven epistemologists (e.g. Greco, Sosa, Riggs) characterize knowledge as a kind of achievement or success from ability. These knowledge-as-achievement accounts look at knowledge as a social practice and knowledge ascriptions as ascriptions of credit for successes that result from the exercise of a cognitive ability. These accounts provide novel solutions to Gettier problems, skeptical worries, and questions about the nature and value of knowledge.

Although these value-driven accounts offer powerful new ways to solve traditional epistemological problems, little work has been done to explore how this conception of knowledge might engage with the ethical dimensions of our epistemic practice identified by feminist epistemologists over the last thirty years. Work in feminist epistemology (e.g. Mills, Tuana, Fricker) highlights the ways in which our epistemic practices regularly fail or malfunction, and how these failures are tied tightly with our social and political structures. As of yet these two areas of epistemology—feminist epistemology and value-driven epistemology—have experienced little cross-pollination. I argue that by developing a social model of knowledge relevant abilities/disabilities we can both strengthen the knowledge-as-achievement accounts and further illuminate the ethical aspects of epistemic practice."

Author(s): Robyn Bluhm

Title: The variability of plasticity

Abstract: My talk addresses the question of "the brain's body" from her vantage point as a philosopher of science. Her research on feminism and neuroscience is informed by work in feminist

philosophy of science, especially work in recent feminist empiricism about the role of values in science. She uses this work to address how scientists who have different values and different background assumptions about the nature of sex/gender and of the brain might interpret evidence about neural plasticity and about the relationship between the brain and the body and then to ask how best to use the resources provided by this plurality of approaches to studying the same phenomena.

Author(s): Tracy Howell

Title: Changing the World One Premise at a Time: The Challenge of Deeply Held Beliefs

Abstract: “Prima facie, good argument has a crucial role to play in addressing socio-political issues and has the potential to bring about socio-political change. Rationally persuading someone that their beliefs or actions are misguided, or that a policy initiative won’t work, looks like a valuable way to employ the tools and skills of argumentation in pursuit of changing the world. Indeed, anyone who has taught critical reasoning has probably emphasised the value of argument in this context. However, despite the widely-held view that an important achievement of critical thinking is reflection on one’s own deeply-held beliefs and their revision or relinquishment where necessary, many of the beliefs that are embedded in our ways of being in the world turn out to be intransigent in the face of standard approaches to rational persuasion.

I begin by considering deeply-held beliefs, discussing the types of beliefs that are deeply-held and the ways in which they are acquired. Focussing on deeply-held beliefs that are relevant to our socio-political imaginaries, beliefs that are prone to prejudice, bias and stereotyping associated with gender, race, sexuality, disability, class and other markers of difference and marginalisation, I show the ways deeply-held beliefs play a framework role in reinforcing our ways of being within the world. Drawing partly from Gatens’ and Lloyd’s Spinozistic take on the role of the imagination in changing our ways of being, and from Young’s work on asymmetrical reciprocity, I show the ways approaches involving showing rather than stating alternatives, approaches involving narratives that construct alternative pictures, and bring to bear the epistemic weight of lived experiences to shift and transform our imaginations by offering insights into the lives of others, offer more effective means of opening deeply-held beliefs up to critical scrutiny than approaches that seek simply to state the truth of contrary beliefs. “

Author(s): Beatrice Choi

Title: Anthropophagic Networks: the role of the “artist class” in Brazilian technology transfer and the myth of use-neutrality

Abstract: “In his 2003 inaugural speech as Minister of Culture, Gilberto Gil vows to “transform the ministry into the home of all those who think about and invent Brazil”, setting favorable conditions for technology-based measures for progress. He infuses his message with tropicalista themes, exclaiming, “We want to do an anthropological massage [to] the body of the ministry”. In a reference to anthropophagy, first coined in poet Oswald de Andrade’s “Manifesto Antropófago”, Gil evokes the cultural tendency to “absorb and digest, European culture and transform it into

something distinctly, uniquely Brazilian”. Through Andrade, Gil voices the frustration shared by Brazilian innovators and artists alike: that the epistemological freedom to claim originals, create art, and define scientific breakthroughs resides predominantly with other developed, often Westernized nations. These communities categorically refuse the assigned role in the “original/derivative” dualism, where Brazil embodies a “necessarily muddy copy of Europe”.

As minister for former president Luíz Inácio “Lula” da Silva, Gil bridges two periods of Brazilian history with diverging investments in local innovation and creative economies. First, in the 1960s-1970s, the Neoconcretismo and Tropicalia movements coincide with the mass introduction of computers during the military dictatorship. Second, during the 1990s-2000s, the technocratic elite embraces open-source software (FLOSS) as cultural policy under Gil’s administration. During these two periods, I argue that an evolving network of artists, scientists, and policymakers compose anthropophagic networks to reflect the changing ideological investments in innovation and cultural production in Brazil. I build a media history through archival records, interviews, and media coverage to investigate how creative economies, which current Minister of Culture Ana de Hollanda labels the “artistic class”, forge networks between the artistic vanguard and technocratic elite, and institutionalize their exchanges as cultural policy.

Ultimately, I consider how intersection of local art and technology exposes the “coloniality of power” behind the pervasive myth that innovation is “use-neutral”.

Author(s): Sharyn Clough

Title: Feminist values as evidence in science

Abstract: If values are ubiquitous in science, then we can no longer use the presence of values to discriminate between good and bad science. Some scientific hypotheses can be empirically well-supported and value-laden. How? Much depends on the nature of empirical support, and the definition of values. I have argued that values can function as empirical claims, and that where relevant and well-supported by evidence, values can increase the empirical strength of particular scientific theories (xxxx). Maya Goldenberg (2012, 2015) refers to this argument as the “values as evidence” approach. This approach is particularly important for explaining the salutary effects in scientific research of some feminist values, and the negative effects of all sexist values. In this paper I respond to concerns with this approach, including those expressed by Linda Alcoff (2006), and in two more recent commentaries (Miriam Solomon 2012; and Audrey Yap 2016). In defense of the values as evidence view, I focus on the need to rethink the nature of our political values, including our feminist values. We need to examine where even our most cherished political values come from and why we hold them. This means recognizing the contingency of our values, and the importance of subjecting them to critical scrutiny. I show that the evidence-based nature of these values is neither a weakness nor an idealization. Abandoning the quest for certainty, embracing pragmatic inquiry, muddling through with our fallible inductive inferences, these are the best practices we’ve got, in science as in politics, and perhaps especially in politically-informed science. As the history of political revolution reminds us, it’s also our only hope.

Author(s): Tabea Cornel

Title: Handedness and Difference

Abstract: This talk approaches the question of the “brain’s body” through historical and STS literature on scientific classification practices, feminist epistemologies and science critiques, and the history of the brain and mind sciences from the late 19th to the early 21st centuries. Her work traces the history of sex/gender and handedness as neuroscientific classification systems, particularly the ways in which both were regarded correlates of physical, intellectual, and moral underdevelopment in the 19th century. Subsequently, the social and scientific valence of handedness slowly decreased. The category was socially de-stigmatized as a result of the 20th-century educational reform movement and similar equalizing dynamics, and it was scientifically de-dichotomized through continuous handedness inventories, which were developed by psychologists around 1970. Sex/gender, however, remained an institutionalized binary classification system that is imbued with social, moral, and scientific meaning. Comparing these disentangling histories of initially intertwined categories provides insight into the disparate careers of two characteristics of the “brain’s body.”

Author(s): Amanda Daniela Cortez

Title: Sleeping on Sheep Skin: Navigating Anthropological Knowledge Production as Scholar and Other

Abstract: The knowledge produced by anthropologists since its inception has built on and perpetuated particular Western notions of the Other and I argue that because of our history, anthropologists have ethical constraints in the kinds of knowledge we can produce. Working with indigenous peoples in anthropology carries with it a particular history of exploitation, and it is this space of knowledge production that I explore in this paper. I discuss what it means to be a white *latina* female anthropologist working amongst indigenous Quechua women in Cusco, Perú. I approach this topic from the position that because anthropology is a product of colonialism and has benefited from exploited, colonized (indigenous) peoples, we produce a kind of knowledge that cannot be disentangled from its history, meaning that the knowledge we produce is always already of a particular kind. I discuss how the history that I carry with me affects my interactions with my research participants and informs how I create an anthropological “Other” to be studied and theorized. In the second part of the paper, I flip the notion of “Other” on its head to recognize that as a white *latina* woman, I am also the “Other” within the academy. This too constrains and shapes the knowledge I create and how others understand it. By bringing together differences of race and ethnicity, gender, and histories, I probe what it means to be a person of difference researching across difference. It is through this exploration that I hope we can come together as scholars to find ways around barriers presented to people of difference and engage in ethical and productive work.

Author(s): Sharon Crasnow

Title: Feminist Standpoint Theory: Tensions, Integrations, and Extensions

Abstract: “Analyses of feminist standpoint theory during the last decade offer better understanding of how the approach preserves feminist value commitments while at the same time meeting epistemic goals of science. These analyses identify three theses of feminist standpoint theory: situated knowledge, epistemic privilege, and achievement (Wylie 2001, 2004; Intemann 2010; Rolin 2009; Crasnow 2012, 2014). I focus on tension revealed by two trends in these recent analyses and propose a way to address these tensions.

The first approach emphasizes the social and political nature of feminist standpoint theory – the achievement thesis. Standpoint is achieved through “struggling with” others members of an oppressed group in order to understand power structures through which oppression distorts knowledge production (e.g., Pohlhaus 2002). Such approaches remind us that the roots of standpoint theory lie in Marxism, and while the political is crucial, the politics need not be Marxist.

Another important element of feminist standpoint methodology calls for “starting from the lives of women” (Smith 1974). And thus the second trend grapples with understanding situated knowledge. Lived experiences are experiences of individuals and the differences among individual experiences are crucial to understanding different forms of oppression. Any account of how epistemic privilege derives from standpoint has to be authentic to the lived experience and situated knowledge of individuals. Earlier misunderstandings of feminist standpoint theory charged the approach with essentializing women, in part because of the tension between the social/political aspects of knowledge and the need for lived experiences as a touchstone.

I argue that a fully developed contemporary feminist standpoint theory should address this tension. A better understanding of struggling with will recognize the fluid, dynamic, social and political aspects of individuals. I make use of resources from intersectionality to develop such an account.”

Author(s): Lacey J. Davidson

Title: The Epistemic Costs of Bias and Systems (Non-)Evaluation

Abstract: “75 percent of people who take the Race IAT reveal automatic White preference, and the majority of those folks—like the researchers who created the test—are surprised by their results. If you’re like me and many others, your IAT results may reveal biases along race, gender, class, sexuality, and ability that do not align with your avowed beliefs. Consequently, the results may seem wrong. A plausible reaction might be to reject these findings, perhaps questioning the validity of the test.

In this paper I will explore the intersection of cognitive science research on implicit biases, hermeneutical injustice, and personal identity in order to assess the perceived individual epistemic costs of evaluating implicit biases and interrogating systems. I will argue that the epistemic costs of these evaluations are taken to be too high to risk, keeping a large number of individuals from interrogating their social, political, and historical situation or the hermeneutical tools given to understand this situation. These costs are thought to be incurred by 1) identifying and appraising one’s social position; 2) considering the role bias plays in perception, reaction, and reasoning; 3) listening to marginalized groups for methodological consistency and understanding; and, 4) most radically, shifting and expanding one’s identity and worldview.

Finally, I will provide some reasons why we should conclude the latter: the epistemic costs and further threat to personal identity incurred though failing to evaluate bias and systems are far greater than those drawn through evaluation. My hope is that my analysis leads individuals to critically identify their own social position, assess their epistemic blindspots, consider the effects of implicit bias both in their own lives and as demonstrated by empirical research, and work toward understanding descriptions of oppression reported by those closest to the issues.”

Author(s): Megan Dean

Title: What’s a good eater? Toward a better account of eaters as agents

Abstract: “It’s not much of an exaggeration to say that Americans are inundated with diet advice. To make sense of this pervasive pressure on us to eat better (which usually means eat more nutritious food), we might conclude that most people eat poorly most of the time. To the frustration of policy-makers, researchers, and health professionals, this poor eating apparently continues despite ubiquitous interventions. In this paper, I contend that these interventions likely fail because they are premised on a pragmatically, conceptually, and ethically misguided picture of the eater qua agent. I begin by sketching out two prominent views of the eater as agent implicit in food policy and research. The first takes the eater to be a rational agent who makes food choices based on knowledge and her values, one of which is or should be her health. The second takes the eater to be an agent whose food choices are highly susceptible to if not determined by the environment, including social and economic pressures. I draw from relational autonomy theorists to point out philosophical issues with both views. I then argue that we have good feminist and anti-racist reasons to be suspicious of these views because they often entail that women, people of colour, and poor people are bad agents. We should instead begin with the assumption that most people are enacting their agency through eating, not failing to be good agents. I conclude by pointing to two accounts of the eater which, on my reading, begin with this premise. I suggest that Chloë Taylor’s Foucauldian account of eating as an identity-constituting practice and Anne Barnhill and colleagues’ view that eating reflects a plurality of values point us in the direction of a more pragmatically, conceptually, and ethically adequate account of the eater qua agent.”

Author(s): Barry DeCoster

Title: Medicalization, Resistance, and Metaphysical Constraints

Abstract: “Medicalization—the process by which conditions become defined and treated as medical problems, i.e., appropriately named and managed by health care professionals—has been a topic of feminist critique. Taken as a whole, feminist and queer critiques have looked askance on medicalization, particularly worrying about the dangers medicalized health poses for women and the disempowered. For example, women’s health generally, and women’s sexuality and childbirth specifically, are paradigmatic of the medicalization. Homosexuality is often cited as the rare case of “success story” in which resistance strategies successfully demedicalized homosexuality, ending the tradition clinical oversight. Generally, feminist philosophers have advocated for replicating demedicalization strategies.

Yet recent work——what I call the “pro-medicalization trend——has asked whether embracing medicalized health can be good for women, or even a successful strategy for resistance to oppression. These arguments go against canonical critiques by queer and feminist authors, by surprisingly embracing medicalization as a positive for women’s health. I argue we should be skeptical about such arguments embracing and perhaps fostering medicalized health.

I argue that this pro-medicalization trend suffers from two points of confusion about strategies for resistance to medicalization. First, I show that the debate about good/bad forms of medicalization misunderstands the metaphysical nature of medicalization: these authors overlook the structural, interlocking, and interdependent systems of political and epistemic power that allow for medicalization to flourish. Second, I begin with showing why arguments for seeing medicalized health as empowering are false. I outline how strategies for successful resistance and demedicalization will require a more complicated, radical, and systematic approach.”

Author(s): Emily Dibble

Zach Schudson

Sari van Anders

Title: “It Was Affirming in Some Ways and Challenging in Others”: Balancing Validation, Education, and Data Collection in a Qualitative Study with Gender and Sexual Minorities.

Abstract: In our presentation, we engage in a reflexive consideration of the complexities of conducting research interviews for a specific scientific project that, nevertheless, take on therapeutic and educational functions for participants. We have been examining the utility of Sexual Configurations Theory (SCT) as a methodology for qualitative explorations of minority sexual and gender identities (e.g., LGBQ, asexual, transgender, non-binary gender, polyamorous). van Anders (2015) proposed SCT as a feminist and queer framework for studying diverse partnered sexualities that addresses several limitations of the concept of sexual orientation and how it is typically studied. Our interviews involved describing key terms and concepts from SCT to help participants visually map their partnered sexualities and gender/sexes on diagrams modeling SCT parameters. Our goal was to record how individuals used the SCT diagrams without correcting them or expressing judgment when their understanding of key concepts differed from ours. Accordingly, we informed participants that they would be ‘always right’ during the interview. This strategy of unconditional validation was intuitively appealing to us as feminist and queer researchers: we understand many of our participants’ identities are subject to stigma and skepticism, harmful dynamics we wanted to avoid replicating. At the same time, this practice of unconditional validation occasionally led us to validate ideas or worldviews that were not in line with our values or the principles of SCT. Additionally, participants’ ideas, worldviews, and self-articulations changed over the course of the interview based on their absorption of SCT as a framework for understanding sexuality and gender/sex. In this presentation, we explore the complexity of studying how individuals articulate their sexualities and gender/sexes when that articulation changes as a result of the research process, and when participants are ‘always right’ at every step along the way.

Author(s): Andrea Doucet

Title: Ecological thinking and ethico-onto-epistemologies: Reconfiguring knowledge making, subjectivities, narratives and ‘vexed questions’ of testimony

Abstract: “Over the past two decades there has been increasing attention by feminist scholars to intra-connections between epistemology, ontology and ethics, or, in Karen Barad’s (2007:185) terms, “ethico-onto-epistemological” entanglements. Here, knowledge- making embodies “thinking with care” (Puig de la Bellacasa 2012:19); attends to “matters of fact and matters of concern” (Latour 2004:233); embraces “capacities for affecting and being affected” (Deleuze 1988:125-126; cited in Code 2006:26); and is emergent through our intra-actions with “the world in its differential becoming” (Barad 2007:185; see also Tuana 2001, 2008, forthcoming). These epistemological reconfigurations are part of diverse transdisciplinary conversations on performative, posthuman, non-representational, and ontologically relational conceptions of subjectivities, knowledge making, and worldmaking. Moreover, they constitute shifts in ethico-onto-epistemological “social imaginaries” (Castoriadis 1998; Code 2006; Verran 2001) from “spectator epistemologies” (Code 2006:41) towards “ecological imaginaries” (Code 2006), “ imaginaries of emergence” (Verran 2001:39, see also Verran 2002, 2013) and “Anthropocene imaginaries” (Tuana forthcoming).

This paper grapples with how these social imaginaries, with reconfigured conceptions of knowledge making and subjectivities, can infuse and inform feminist ethnographic research practices. Working with “diffractive readings” (Barad 2007; Haraway 1997) of Lorraine Code’s ecological thinking and related feminist interventions, I ask: how might ecological thinking be distilled into research practices that embody “thinking with care” and “feeling-with” (Kruks 2001:168). I take up Code’s (2006:205) “vexed questions” about how researchers “situated in comfort and stability can know radically ‘other’ selves and situations well enough to judge/advocate/intervene without appropriating or colonizing them”. I explore these questions through ecological thinking and its informing resources, especially existential phenomenology and narrative studies, while also connecting with other transdisciplinary approaches, including “ontological narrativity” (Somers 1994, 1995), postqualitative feminist methodologies (e.g. Lather 2006, 2013, 2015), and Indigenous and decolonizing methodologies (Kovach 2010; Sandoval 2000; Tuhwai Smith 2012, 2014). “

Author(s): Paula Droege

Title: Why materialists should be feminists

Abstract: For most of my scholarly life, my interest in philosophy of mind and my interest in feminism have been separate and distinct pursuits. It is time for this to change. As a materialist I am committed to an explanation of mental phenomena in physical terms. At one time that commitment entailed logical arguments about the analytical reduction of folk psychology to physics. Now, a more empirically-based, interdisciplinary approach to explanation demands engagement with the world in a way that is distinctively feminist. We need practices by which we can learn to speak the language of other disciplines and to understand the value of alternative methodologies. I will take current debates about animal consciousness as a exemplary case study. Materialists also need feminism to interrogate the social and political forces that structure our work. The sorts of questions we ask, the way questions are formulated, and the way evidence is gathered in support of answers are all shaped

by assumptions about what and who is valuable. Feminists offer a critique of these assumptions that can open up the field to alternative ways of thinking, and can help remedy gender, racial, economic, and other forms of inequality endemic to the business of philosophy of mind. In sum, feminist materialism balances the drive toward truth grounded in reality with a recognition that our epistemological tools are shaped by history and so need to be regularly reconfigured in response to changing demands.

Author(s): Isis Persephone D'Shaun

Title: Black, Human, Other, Woman: Exploring Intersections of Race, Gender, and the Production of Knowledge in Anthropology

Abstract: Anthropological research has been integral to the ways in which we talk and think about gender and race as social constructions, yet anthropology departments may fare no better than any other department when it comes to addressing issues of racism and sexism. Here I explore what it means to be the only Black American woman in an academic context that is theoretically engaged with the social processes that produce experiences of racism and sexism, but faces a variety of constraints when addressing issues around these experiences.

Author(s): Emily Dumler-Winckler

Emanuele Ratti

Title: Overcoming Epistemologies of Ignorance: the virtues of justice and the ideal of communality

Abstract: It is becoming increasingly difficult to ignore or deny that inequalities and exclusions on the basis of gender continue to plague the practice of science. Less attention has been given, however, to the cause of these injustices and their implications for achieving the internal goods of scientific practice, namely scientific knowledge. This paper takes up both of these themes by examining the ethical formation of scientists, the ideals of scientific practice, and their implications for knowledge. The argument is twofold. First, we draw on ethics and the history and philosophy of science to argue that the virtues of justice among scientists are necessary to remedy injustice on the basis of gender in the pursuit of Robert Merton's scientific ideal of communality. Professional codes of conduct in the sciences generally rely on the assumption that compliance is simply a matter of clarifying relevant norms without attending to the moral formation of scientists. The virtues of justice provide a helpful antidote. Justice is the virtue that enables a person to give others their due, to achieve a just state of affairs. By cultivating the virtues of justice scientists can learn to not only recognize but also to rectify gender based injustice, to actively pursue the ideal of communality. However, this is not only a matter of justice. The second part of our argument uses case studies to demonstrate that gender equality and inclusion in the practice of science does, in fact, yield greater knowledge. For example, one case study has shown that the inclusion of feminist perspectives resulted in a better account of the process of embryonic sexual differentiation. The virtues of justice and the ideal of communality are, we argue, crucial for overcoming epistemologies of ignorance. It is becoming increasingly difficult to ignore or deny that inequalities and exclusions on the basis of gender continue to plague the practice of science. Less attention has been given, however, to the cause of

these injustices and their implications for achieving the internal goods of scientific practice, namely scientific knowledge. This paper takes up both of these themes by examining the ethical formation of scientists, the ideals of scientific practice, and their implications for knowledge. The argument is twofold. First, we draw on ethics and the history and philosophy of science to argue that the virtues of justice among scientists are necessary to remedy injustice on the basis of gender in the pursuit of Robert Merton's scientific ideal of communality. Professional codes of conduct in the sciences generally rely on the assumption that compliance is simply a matter of clarifying relevant norms without attending to the moral formation of scientists. The virtues of justice provide a helpful antidote. Justice is the virtue that enables a person to give others their due, to achieve a just state of affairs. By cultivating the virtues of justice scientists can learn to not only recognize but also to rectify gender based injustice, to actively pursue the ideal of communality. However, this is not only a matter of justice. The second part of our argument uses case studies to demonstrate that gender equality and inclusion in the practice of science does, in fact, yield greater knowledge. For example, one case study has shown that the inclusion of feminist perspectives resulted in a better account of the process of embryonic sexual differentiation. The virtues of justice and the ideal of communality are, we argue, crucial for overcoming epistemologies of ignorance.

Author(s): Perri Eason, Linda Fuselier, J. Kasi Jackson and Rachel Stoiko

Title: Fruit Flies to Phalaropes: Textbook Examples and Scientific Knowledge Production

Abstract: Textbook examples, or species used as case studies, enhance learning, evoke emotion, and influence perspective. It is well known that novices rely on examples more than the rest of the text to learn novel content knowledge. Thus, the species that become "textbook examples" of phenomena have lasting influence on the learner's perception and understanding of what science is, how it is practiced and how communities of practitioners produce knowledge. In this paper, we examined the examples showcased in chapters on sexual selection within college-level introductory evolutionary biology textbooks. We focused on the consistency between textual descriptions of changes in the discipline and the chosen examples. Previously, we had found that textbooks included alternatives to the classic view of fixed sex roles in their discussions of sexual selection. Some textbooks even referenced feminist science studies' influence on theorizing in the discipline and cited scholars who are feminist evolutionary biologists. In this study, we found that all textbooks used similar species and systems to exemplify major themes from sexual selection research.

Most books used current studies and recently published data to describe example species or processes, thus exemplifying for students the production of rational scientific knowledge by referring them to the primary literature and the researchers who produce it. Exemplification of Bateman's Principles moved from fruit flies, a standard model organism, to a wider variety of species. Sex-role-reversed species, where females exhibit the male role and vice versa, regularly appeared as the exceptions that prove the rule; Bateman's Principles predict the switch in sex roles between male and female. Despite the large and growing number of in-text discussion of alternative views of sexual selection, detailed examples of species illustrating variable or flexible sex roles did not appear in most books. Thus, the dominance of the classic view remains in the learner's mind.

Author(s): Aron Edidin

Title: Epistemic Agency, Relational Autonomy, and the Value of Knowledge and Belief

Abstract: ““Credit-worthiness” accounts of the value of knowledge focus on the exercise of agency as the source of value in question. This focus is shared by an approach suggested by Sally Haslanger to the value of belief (and thus true belief). The standard examples and counterexamples from the “value of knowledge” literature treat the relevant sort of agency in fundamentally individualistic terms. But recent work on relational autonomy recommends that we think of agency as fundamentally socially embedded. This reorientation not only disarms a standard objection to the “credit-worthiness” approach, but suggests that the putative counterexample is actually a paradigm-case of the exercise of epistemic agency for creatures like us. In so doing, it also exhibits the agency-based account of the value of knowledge and its main competitor, which focuses on the status of potential informants, as two sides of the same coin.

Meanwhile, epistemic agency is an essential component of agency tout court. Effective action requires information. But perhaps the possession of information can take other forms than the having of true beliefs. Paul Churchland characterizes what’s peculiar to belief in terms of the sentential form in “that”-clauses in belief attributions. The alternatives that he envisages divorce informational content from sentence content. But for creatures like us, sentences are the basic units of communication of information. If our agency is paradigmatically exercised in socially embedded contexts, an essential part of the picture is that our information be in substantial measure communicable in sentences, i.e., that it take the form of beliefs. So the socially-oriented version of the agency-based approach to the value of knowledge also confirms Haslanger’s hunch that the value of belief can be vindicated and developed in terms of the role of belief in the exercise of agency for creatures like us.”

Author(s): Kathleen Kolakovich Eggleston

Title: A Case for STEM Macroethics Education

Abstract: In recent years, the inclusion of ethics curricula in STEM education programs at the undergraduate and graduate levels has garnered increased attention and resources. High profile cases of intentional wrongdoing by specific individuals, such as the retraction of fraudulent publications, have provided some of the impetus for this shift. Indeed, many well-developed STEM ethics topics and teaching materials pertain to the responsible conduct of research (RCR) and other scenarios at the individual level, collectively known as microethics. Macroethics, in contrast, addresses dilemmas at the societal level. Unlike the emphasis on wrongdoing inherent to microethics, macroethics considerations can guide positive advances toward responsible innovation and informed stewardship. STEM macroethics is also strongly linked to some of humanity’s major challenges—such as global climate change and epidemic levels of obesity—all involving myriad interconnected factors, moral agents, decisions, and potential remediating responses. This FEMMSS paper will report upon the supporting rationale, National Science Foundation-supported development of, and results associated with, a STEM macroethics education resource recognized by the National Academy of Engineering as one of 25 exemplary ethics education programs nationwide. It is centered upon a hypothetical, but realistic, case; one including complexities and uncertainties in

multiple dimensions of both human and scientific epistemologies. In particular, the author will consider theory and results supporting this resource's integration of role play experience with diverse stakeholder perspectives and an emphasis on communication. The combination of these pedagogical and topical components is intended to strategically pursue one of the overall goals of the STEM ethics education field: priming STEM professionals-in-training for effective contribution toward just policies and positive outcomes at the community and societal levels.

Author(s): Cameron Evans

Title: Not Feminist, Not Queer: A Reparative Ethics for Theorizing Trans*

Abstract: “In 1981, Heidi Hartmann argued that academic feminism was being “swallowed whole” by Marxist theory. Capitalism and sexism, she argued, are conceptually separable spheres of oppression. In 1994, Cheshire Calhoun used Hartmann’s method to argue feminist theory was swallowing lesbian theory: sexism and heterosexism are separable spheres of oppression. I push this argumentative machinery further to argue that uniquely trans voices are at risk of being swallowed by feminist and queer dialogues. I argue that the political systems which make it difficult to live as trans are in principle separable from sexism and heterosexism. That is, we can imagine a world in which sexism and heteronormativity have been leveled, yet it is still unacceptable for individuals to signal or behave as though they are a gender different from the one assigned at birth — where systems of cisgenderism still hold.

My argument is not that feminist and queer theories fail to illuminate trans experience at all — we should be surprised if they were unable. Rather, I am encouraging trans theorists to develop their distinctive theoretical voices in order to expose the struggles particular to trans lives. Importantly, we should not assume feminist and queer tools can do justice to trans struggles.

Though being a feminist or queer theorist don’t entail you reject the legitimacy of trans bodies, trans voices, and trans lives, I highlight the ways in which feminist and queer tools are employed to render trans issues illegible. I argue theorists should be circumspect of their heritage and understand how their theoretical commitments can tear them in different directions when it comes to reading trans lives. “

Author(s): Manuela Fernandez Pinto

Title: Doubly Disadvantaged: The Recruitment of Diverse Subjects for Clinical Trials in Latin America

Abstract: “As emphasized by women’s health advocates, the inclusion of research subjects who have been traditionally excluded from medical research is the first major step to acquire more specific knowledge about diseases that affect that particular group of patients, as well as to develop better treatments. In addition to this epistemic gain, an appropriate diversification of research subjects aims to address issues of sexism, racism, and previous history of exploitation and abuse of research subjects. However, two important challenges arise. First, the recruitment of women and minorities for clinical research can be challenging, especially among groups with histories of clinical abuse and patient exploitation. Second, patients in high-income countries, where most revenues for pharmaceutical companies are located, tend to consume more medicines and thus become less ideal

as subjects for clinical trials. Due to its allegedly diverse population and strong doctor-patient relations, Latin America has become one of the most attractive locations for international clinical trials.

In the paper, I examine the case of recruitment of women and minority patients to serve as subjects of international clinical trials, through CROs operating in Latin America. After analyzing the epistemic and ethical shortcomings of such endeavor, I argue that Latin American patients participating in such trials are located in a position of double-disadvantage. First, they suffer the consequences of a lack of appropriate understanding of symptoms and reaction to treatment in women and other underrepresented groups, which has led in turn to unnecessary suffering and death. Second, they suffer the direct consequences of being subjects in clinical trials which are not design to meet their needs, but the needs of patients in the Global North.

Accordingly, I conclude by highlighting the importance of acknowledging this double disadvantage and formulating a critique to the neoliberal model of research organization.”

Author(s): Lauren Freeman
Heather Stewart

Title: GENDER MICROAGGRESSIONS IN CLINICAL MEDICINE: A FEMINIST CRITIQUE OF BEAUCHAMP AND CHILDRESS’ PRINCIPLE OF NON-MALEFICENCE

Abstract: Using tools of analytic feminist philosophy, this paper launches a critique of Beauchamp and Childress’ principle of non-maleficence. Specifically, we argue that their articulation of the principle is reductive insofar as it considers only physical harms and thus fails to capture another class of non-physical harms that patients frequently experience in clinical settings and that are just as serious as physical harms. There are three kinds of non-physical harms that concern us, all of which can result from microaggressions. They are epistemic harms, emotional harms, and existential harms. Insofar as these harms result from microaggressions experienced in medical encounters, they have the further consequence of undermining physician-patient relationships, precluding relationships of trust, and therefore of compromising the kind and quality of care that is received. Insofar as this is the case, we argue that the (primarily) non-physical harms that result from microaggressions are just as serious as the physical harms upon which Beauchamp and Childress focus, and thus, that it is a deep oversight that they fail to include them in their account of the principle of non-maleficence.

Our paper has four sections. First, we provide a brief overview of Beauchamp and Childress’s principle of non-maleficence as it appears in Principles of Biomedical Ethics. Second, we define and explain what microaggressions are, focusing specifically on gender microaggressions. Third, we discuss and give examples of three kinds of harms that result from such gender microaggressions and elaborate upon their damaging consequences. Based upon our feminist analysis, we conclude that Beauchamp and Childress’ neglect to deal with non-physical harms that result from gender microaggressions leaves us with a principle of non-maleficence that is reductive. We argue that it requires further elaboration to include non-physical harms among the harms that healthcare workers are obligated to avoid.

Author(s): Karen Frost-Arnold

Title: Lurking, Ignorance, and Ontological Expansiveness: A Virtue Epistemology for the Internet

Abstract: An epistemically virtuous person attempts to unlearn their socially constructed ignorance of their own privileges and prejudices. The epistemologies of ignorance literature has revealed various ways of becoming privilege cognizant, including seeking beneficial epistemic friction (Medina 2013) and ‘world’-traveling (Lugones 2003), among others. The internet provides some opportunities for these practices. The privileged can read blogs, tweets, Facebook posts, and Reddit threads written by members of marginalized groups in order to learn more about the oppression others face. In this way, lurking (i.e., reading online communications without engaging in the conversation oneself) can have some epistemic benefits. But by merely lurking, an agent forgoes the sustained interactions and relationships that many philosophers argue are important to unlearning ignorance. Merely lurking also protects one from having one’s own prejudices openly challenged. Thus, the virtues of lurking need to be carefully balanced with the virtues of online critical engagement across differences. But there are also dangers in these critical dialogues. Ontological expansiveness is a habit of white privilege that poses one such threat to cross-racial online engagement: white scripts of ontological expansiveness encourage whites to expect control, to focus on their own interests, and to assume that they have the right to enter any public space (Sullivan 2006). These habits of privilege manifest themselves in common practices of whites derailing or hijacking online spaces and conversations for people of color. While well-intentioned whites may aim to unlearn their ignorance by engaging with people of color in online conversations, these epistemic practices need to be developed in the context of an epistemically virtuous character that can discern when to engage, when to lurk, and how to avoid white habits of ontological expansiveness. This paper argues that we need a virtue epistemology for lurking to address these challenges, and it presents one such theory.

Author(s): Linda Fuselier, Perry Eason, J. Kasi Jackson and Rachel Stoiko

Title: Picturing Sexual Selection

Abstract: Most feminist-informed analysis of images in books intended for education has been conducted with children’s books and K-12 textbooks. It has focused on portrayal of stereotypical female and male gender roles in photographs and comparisons of the order and number of images of males versus females. In this paper, we examined photographs and illustrations in evolutionary biology textbook chapters on sexual selection. Within the written content, textbooks have adopted recent changes in sexual selection theory and even cite feminist critique. Are these changes reflected in the books’ images? We studied the images because images attract the attention of both learners and instructors and thus, can have a stronger impact on understanding compared to written content. Also, textbook images often comprise a significant amount of the material included in pre-packaged slides for lecturers and thus help to drive classroom content.

We coded images in evolutionary biology textbook chapters on sexual selection to determine if the impact of the feminist critique on the writing was reflected in the selection of images. We used a series of textbooks from one publisher that were published from 1998 through 2014. This series had (relative to other books examined) the most comprehensive coverage of material that challenges

current paradigms and included the most explicit acknowledgment of feminist impacts. We used categories from the classic and alternative views of sexual selection and associated sex roles to develop our initial coding. In subsequent rounds, we focused on the images' depictions of power and agency. For example, were males and females portrayed as passive or active? We included both the visual information and the caption content, coded separately. Similar to the results of our investigation of example species, we found that images presented a more restricted and traditional view of sex roles than the written text.

Author(s): Margaret F. Gibson

Patty Douglas

Title: Toward a queer history of autism science: A case study of Ivar Lovaas

Abstract: This paper “queers” the history of autism science through an examination of the overlap between the regulation of autism with that of gender and sexuality in the work of Ole Ivar Lovaas. Central questions explored include: How has scientific involvement in the regulation of gender and sexuality been linked to the regulation of autistic behavior? What new insights into interlocking oppressions and regulatory practices are gleaned by considering autism science alongside the history of scientific investigations into gender and sexuality? The work of Ivar Lovaas offers a prime case study for these complex intersections. Lovaas is the founder of Applied Behavior Analysis, the most commonly used and funded autism intervention today that seeks to extinguish autistic behaviors, primarily among children (Williams & Williams, 2011). Less commonly recognized is Lovaas's involvement in the Feminine Boy Project, where he catalogued and developed interventions into the gender identities and behaviors of young people (Burke, 1997; Dawson, 2008). We use disability studies and queer theory critiques to understand queer, trans, and autistic identities as contested, constructed and intersecting historical and socio-political phenomena (Jack, 2014; Kafer, 2013; McRuer, 2006; Nadesan, 2005; McGuire, 2016; Silberman, 2015; Silverman, 2012). We argue that a queer disability studies lens opens up the richness of autism as a cultural nexus, and deepens understandings of intersecting and contested histories of science, professional scopes of practice, and dominant futurities. The paper advances emerging feminist and disability studies scholarship and autism self-advocacy on the disabling material effects of autism science in the lives of autistic persons and those that work with and care for them. In particular, this case study highlights the need for feminist science studies to investigate the historical and contemporary links between dominant scientific constructions of disability, gender, and sexuality.

Author(s): Rebecca Gibson

Title: The Case of DB13-1 765: Seeing Non-Binary Genders in Bioarchaeological Samples

Abstract: In the field of bioarchaeology, skeletal sex assessment has five categorical divisions—female, most likely female, indeterminate, most likely male, and male. These divisions are assigned on the basis of a preponderance of morphometric traits which are considered biological sex indicators. What, then, is the anthropologist to do when a skeleton presenting as indeterminate has been recorded as female in the archaeological record? One such case, a skeleton designated DB13-1

765 in the collection at the Musée de l'Homme in Paris, presents an interesting conundrum. This skeleton is recorded as being female not through observer error, but because of the composition of the collection—people were ‘acquired’ by the museum and skeletonized very shortly after death—she almost certainly had the outward appearance of a woman, and lived and died as a woman. Her skeleton, however, tells a different story. Robust, with large dense bones and prominently male skeletal features, the good majority of the skeleton presents as anatomically male. The pelvis, on the other hand, presents as female, and there is contingent evidence that she had given birth. In this presentation, I will discuss the specifics of this case as it confounded my overall research objectives, as well as detailing comparisons between female and male skeletal traits; querying what we can and cannot distinguish about lived gendered experience in the skeletal record; and offering perspectives on how embodiment theory can assist in respecting both the biological and the cultural in bioarchaeological studies.

Author(s): Heidi Grasswick

Title: Epistemic Responsibility in a Social World of Knowing

Abstract: “One of the major contributions of feminist and social epistemologists who explicitly write on epistemic responsibility has been a shift in focus, away from a concentration on responsibly-held belief, and toward discussions of what constitutes participation in responsible practices of inquiry. In this paper I first discuss two elements of a robust conception of responsible practices of inquiry. First, in a social world of knowing, decisions about how we circulate and share knowledge with each other have both epistemic and ethical effects, and as such responsible practices of inquiry require norms of knowledge circulation, not just knowledge production. Second, I employ the feminist work in epistemologies of ignorance to demonstrate how responsible practices of inquiry must include assessments of for whom the knowledge being produced, and whether the practices are maintaining areas of ignorance that support the social positions of dominant groups.

In the latter part of the paper I look more specifically at what constitutes responsible participation in such practices on the part of individuals, using examples of scientific practices that involve gender bias. Because individuals rely on these social practices to engage in inquiry, they cannot be held fully responsible for the merits and shortcomings of the practices themselves. Yet it is plausible to demand of epistemically responsible individuals that they at times reflect on how well these social practices are succeeding at satisfying the epistemic goals attributed to them, and attempt to select practices to participate in that are epistemically responsible. On the account of responsible practices of inquiry I have sketched out, these assessments will include both ethical and epistemic dimensions concerning how well variously situated knowers (and not just the individual inquirer at hand) are being served by these practices. “

Author(s): Alex Hanna

Anna Hoffmann

Title: Towards a Feminist Computational Social Science

Abstract: “This article puts forth several principles for a feminist computational social science. With the incredible pace in which the methodologies in data science / big data / computational social science have developed, consideration of how these methodologies fit into the larger framework of social science methodology is often considered as an afterthought by practitioners. A significant literature, however, has begun to appear which is critical of these methods, especially within science and technology studies, infrastructure studies, and surveillance studies. However, these critiques do not often point the way towards how practitioners should alter their research practice.

This article synthesizes the various literatures around feminist method and data ethics, and translates them into concrete tasks of a feminist computational social science practice. We suggest three practical tasks of a feminist computational social science. First, identify the different working parts of the data-generation process. This would involve interrogating the different design choices in digital trace data, the affordances allowed by the algorithms and programmers, and the hidden labor and coding decisions of human annotators. Second, allow for uncertainty in both exploration and classification. Data exploration itself is an inductive task, but the process of classification can be made such that divisions are explored and problematized. Last, supplement results with other methodologies which do not suffer from the biases of computational social science work. This involves locating and analyzing corroborating data from surveys, interviews, ethnography, and human content analysis.

Lastly, we highlight some possible exemplars of feminist computational social science within the field of social movement scholarship. This includes research that takes a field-level approach to digitally-enabled movements, uses computational grounded theory approach to interrogate texts, pairs computational data with interviews of social media users, and discusses the uncertainty and labor of human annotators in the annotation process. “

Author(s): Sandra Harding

Title: Reinventing Positivism? Latin American and U.S. Women’s Movements

Abstract: “The increasing global spread of social justice movements since the 1960’s provides precisely the kind of resource that can enable a fifth emergence of positivist philosophies of science—in this case a socially progressive one that is appropriate for this moment in history. It is possible that this one will not fail—at least not for the reasons the preceding four did. The preceding four were British utilitarianism, Comte’s French positivism, the nineteenth century Latin American intentional —misreadingll of Comtean positivism, and the Vienna Circle’s Germanic positivism that turned philosophy of science into —the icy slopes of logicll when it encountered McCarthyism and the Cold War in the U.S.

Recently extended analyses of what went wrong with the Latin American and Vienna Circle positivisms have appeared. (Gilson and Levinson 2013, Reisch 2005) It turns out that both gained power initially as hoped-for solutions to prevailing social disorder and both made unrealistic assumptions about how to decrease political and economic inequality. Significantly, they lacked the kinds of feminist projects visible today. In neither case did there exist sufficiently powerful social justice movements to block the transformation of socially progressive ideals into technocratic ones. Both Latin American and U.S. feminisms have participated recently in the rise of wide-scale social

movements: the World Social Forums originating in Porte Alegre and Rainbow Coalition type of conjoined feminist, LGBT, anti-racist, anti-colonial, and poor people's movements in the U.S. And they have pinpointed how addressing the feminist issues is a necessity if these movements are to succeed.

This presentation will identify some significant ways in which feminist projects around the globe are making crucial contributions to these new philosophies of science of the social justice movements.”

Author(s): Susan Hawthorne

Danielle Chalifoux

Title: How ‘Effectiveness’ Hinders Mental Illness Care and Policy

Abstract: Shortcomings abound in US legal, medical, scientific, and social realms policies and practices around serious mental illnesses such as schizophrenia and bipolar disorder. It's difficult, however, to determine how to improve the situation. One problem is disagreement about the ethics of common responses to serious mental illness—diagnostic categorization, drug treatment, civil commitment, resource allocation, and imprisonment are all controversial. Another problem is inadequate empirical information to guide change. Even in the most studied area—pharmacological treatment—information is severely limited., particularly in its real-world applicability. Other areas—mainstream (cognitive behavioral therapy) and alternative—such as peer counseling, Eastern medical strategies, music therapy, alternative housing or family support arrangements—have even more sharply limited evidence bases. This paper, part of a larger project, takes one road into these complexities. It analyzes how terms such as “effectiveness,” “recovery,” “survival,” “chronicity,” and “futility,” are used in literatures of psychiatry, various branches of psychology, forensics, and personal narratives of people with serious mental illness. Each such term embeds—in varying degrees and kinds—normative goals and measurable features. We are currently immersed in the study, but our early findings suggest that different fields and constituencies differ radically—perhaps incommensurately—in their goals. For example, “effectiveness” in a drug trial might be marked primarily by short-term relief from delusions, while a successful “recovery” may allow for continued delusions, but with new coping skills that allow function in chosen social settings. Epistemic standards appear equally diverse, ranging from evidence-based medicine's reliance on randomized controlled trials to the individualized views of narrative and law. In addition, the sheer abundance of definitions hinders communication and progress. We hope our analysis will identify roadblocks and find areas of agreement on which to build better institutions and practices legal, medical, and social policy and institutions to improve the lives of those who are mentally ill.

Author(s): Darryl Heller

Terri Russ

Title: Taking it to the Streets: Transcending Privilege, Positionality, and Personhood Through Community Engagement

Abstract: In 1989 Kimberle Crenshaw coined the term “intersectionality” to describe the ways oppressive institutions work together as systems of subjugation for disenfranchised groups.

Crenshaw argues that in order to overcome past and present injustices we need to move beyond a narrow focus and address the intersecting aspects of identity politics in question. In this paper we discuss a working community based engagement initiative in which we bring together traditionally disenfranchised disparate groups in the community as a way of fostering new relationships to help spur transformation through engagement in an academic based community meeting place. As a working team we represent a model of intersectionality through our own positionality and personhood that helps bridge existing divides between traditionally disenfranchised groups. We are interdisciplinary crossing multiple disciplinary boundaries to bring together praxis oriented research from the disciplines of history, communication studies, African studies, and Gender and Women studies. Individually we bridge traditional dichotomies of personhood including man/woman, black/white, straight/gay. We address such questions as how can individual subject identities and positionality be used to cross boundaries and connect the academy with the community? How can we use individual privilege to help fight issues of racism, sexism, and homophobia? How can we help disenfranchised groups come together to find commonplaces? How can we create new systems of rhetoric to communicate in positive and productive ways about difference?

Author(s): Tempest Henning

Title: 'Let Me Hear Your Body Talk' – Testimony and the Politics of Black Female Respectability

Abstract: This paper is an investigation into the prospects of bodily censorship, regarding the politics of black respectability, being conceived as cases of testimonial injustice. I will argue that the very ways in which the politics of respectability reshapes and comports black female mannerisms is suppressing certain communicative affects, concepts, and non-conceptual knowledge. Testimony under this investigation will be construed within a broader sense not only pertaining to illocutionary acts, but bodily gestures and facial expressions that can communicate different forms of non-conceptual knowledge and various affective states. The body can be a medium in which we communicate, or testify, with other embodied individuals. Communicative bodily phenomena such as eye rolling, a twist of the neck, side eye, and pursed lips all can be a testament to certain knowledge claims or affective states. The suppression of such knowledge and affective communication, I argue, falls under the conception of testimonial smothering, which is the coerced truncation of an individual's testimony. The testimony is edited to only convey certain content in which the receiver has shown competence. Within the realm of black respectability politics, not only is content being edited, but various modes of testifying are being jettisoned due to receiver incompetence to accurately uptake the content and/or correctly understand the mode of testimony. Much of the literature regarding testimonial injustices, specifically testimonial smothering, conceives of testimony as soling involving illocutionary acts. This paper seeks to bring the body into our conceptions of testimony and examine the ways in which, as a mode of 'speaking,' the black female body is oppressed and can experience a new mode of testimonial injustices. Such an examination will be more able to account for the various ways in which testimonial smothering occurs.

Author(s): Cassie Herbert

Title: Believing Survivors and Belief in Survivors

Abstract: “Survivors of sexual assault and harassment are often, both implicitly and explicitly, disbelieved. While some reasons for this have been well examined, I offer an account of a distinctly different form of disbelief. This occurs in non-legal contexts from people who herald the importance of objectivity in evaluating and responding to testimony about sexual violence and harassment. Though sometimes coming from well-intentioned people, this push for objectivity and caution masks that in extending the benefit of the doubt to the reported assailant, we default to disbelieving the testimony of survivors.

I distinguish between reports and accusations, particularly insofar as they relate to belief in speaker testimony. Reports call for default belief; the audience looks for conflicting evidence, and if any is found they reevaluate their belief. Accusations call for default disbelief; the audience looks for corroborating evidence, and if any is found they reevaluate their disbelief.

Mistaking reports for accusations impacts the pragmatic output of survivor testimony. First, whether survivor testimony is defaulted to being believed or disbelieved impacts whether material steps are taken in the interim to secure community and survivor safety and wellbeing. This especially holds in workplaces and university settings. Second, if survivor testimony is taken as an accusation then their testimony is already disbelieved by default. When survivor testimony is the only evidence of sexual assault or harassment, that evidence is already held in a position of distrust and the audience is less likely to ultimately believe survivors’ accounts. Finally, believing survivors is a way to show belief in survivors. Disbelief, similarly, shows lack of trust in survivors, and constitutes survivors’ position outside of the audience’s moral community. Misconstruing survivor testimony has real, material repercussions on both survivors and the communities with which they are engaged. Survivors of sexual assault and harassment are often, both implicitly and explicitly, disbelieved. While some reasons for this have been well examined, I offer an account of a distinctly different form of disbelief. This occurs in non-legal contexts from people who herald the importance of objectivity in evaluating and responding to testimony about sexual violence and harassment. Though sometimes coming from well-intentioned people, this push for objectivity and caution masks that in extending the benefit of the doubt to the reported assailant, we default to disbelieving the testimony of survivors.

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outside of the audience's moral community. Misconstruing survivor testimony has real, material repercussions on both survivors and the communities with which they are engaged.”

Author(s): Amanda Huminski

Title: Experimental Philosophy and Feminist Epistemology: Conflicting or Complementary Methodologies?

Abstract: “It might seem that the recent turn toward experimental philosophy, which aims to transport philosophy from the armchair to the laboratory, would be supported by feminist epistemology insofar as experimental philosophy signifies a break from the tradition of primarily white, Western, middle-class, straight men making universalizing proclamations from the top of the ivory tower. However, the relationship between the two is not so straightforward. An analysis of their connection bears upon broader questions concerning philosophical methodology and epistemic standards more generally.

This project presents an overview of some salient theoretical considerations motivating a particular variety of experimental philosophy, as well as some critiques of such, both presented with an eye toward input from feminist epistemology. I explore some motivations for and critiques of experimental philosophy, as they are presented in the experimental philosophy literature, including the motivation to diversify philosophy and address issues of bias in theorizing. Furthermore, I attempt to draw out a handful of specific concerns brought to light by feminist epistemology, while introducing some original concerns of my own, and examine their relationship to current experimental philosophy literature. Some of these concerns (related to bias in the interpretation of data) directly butt up against the purported theoretical motivations of a particular type of experimental philosophy, while the remaining concerns (related to native informant critiques, threats of essentialism, and scientism) are contingently related to some current practices in the field. I end with an appeal to Helen Longino's discussion of scientific communities and I elaborate on her work to suggest that some goals of experimental philosophy might be better achieved—and some other pitfalls avoided—by applying Longino's framework to philosophical methodology (as a complement to experimental philosophy), rather than merely advocating for a quantifiable collection of data points.”

Author(s): Catherine Hundleby

Title: Beyond the Adversary Paradigm: Argument Repair

Abstract: “I suggest that philosophy textbooks that promote the value of argument repair can serve as sites for resisting the Adversary Method's operation as a default mode of reasoning, not just in philosophy but across disciplines and throughout North American culture. The Adversary Method that Janice Moulton (1983) argued dominates philosophy as a Kuhnian paradigm creates both epistemological problems and social injustices. Narrowing of argumentative discourse facilitates complete defeat of one position by another and provides for the operation of the Adversary Method. Narrowing discourse heightens the risk of misinterpretation of practical problems and tends to reflect the assumptions of people with social privilege, epistemologically marginalizing

people who are socially marginalized, an epistemic injustice. In turn this standard for argumentation presents problems for general standards of argumentation because courses in critical thinking taught by philosophers provide the usual source of post-secondary education in reasoning for students across the disciplines and practical fields. Critical thinking textbooks by philosophers often reflect the Adversary Paradigm, according to this author's previously published and ongoing empirical research.

The consideration of argument repair, described most fully by Richard L. Epstein, broadens discourse and so hedges against the narrowing interpretive pressures of the Adversary Method. It constitutes a basic way to allow room for other approaches to argumentation, to resist default assumption of the Adversary Method, and to keep in view the greater collaborative purposes that Method serves epistemologically. Argument repair provides technical advances on the "principle of a charity" in interpretation and a logic more amenable to a range of dialectical interactions that can constitute argumentation. It also captures the larger cooperative epistemological purposes that drive much argumentation, including Adversarial argumentation (Rooney 2010)."

Author(s): M.A. Hunter

Title: Philosophers Behaving Badly: The Systemic Failures of "Experimental Philosophy"

Abstract: "This paper will argue that the experimental philosophy movement has a systemic problem that greatly undermines and hinders the success of the movement. The experimental philosophy movement systemically excludes the voices of marginalised people, especially so from the standpoint of the participants in the experiments. Experimental philosophers have not taken seriously enough the notion that their methodology and survey parameters have ignored particular groups of individuals in ways that are harmful to the communities of people whom they have ignored.

To bring to light the serious issue that the experimental philosophy movement faces, this paper uses both quantitative and qualitative data from the past ten years of experimental philosophy publications. Quantitatively speaking, the experimental philosophy movement systemically excludes data on marginalised persons — due to the fact that the movement, on aggregate, does not even allow for participants to self-identify in important ways. Qualitatively, a number of vignettes and proclamations made on the basis of problematic empirical results can be a source of epistemic harm for marginalised communities. The inability to reflect groupings that societies deem as important inhibits both the move to make experimental philosophy and academic philosophy (in general) more inclusive.

In conclusion, this paper offers a number of solutions to positively change the experimental philosophy movement. Benefits of addressing systemic issues in the experimental philosophy movement are the following: more inclusiveness in the discipline, more robust results from experiments, and the potential to introduce different research projects that appeal to under-represented groups. The suggested changes to the movement will have a positive reverberating effect on both the discipline and upon what we can know about groups that have been implicitly or overtly ignored."

Author(s): J. Kasi Jackson and Linda Fuselier

Title: A Timeline of Alternatives to the Classic View of Sexual Selection

Abstract: The classic view of sexual selection, proposed by Darwin, focuses on static sex roles, in which males compete for or display to attract females. Males are limited in reproduction by the number of females with which they can mate, whereas females are limited by energy constraints. Thus, it profits males to maximize their number of mates and for females, the quality of their mates. Alternatives address sex role variation and flexibility. They include female alliances, female competition, female multiple mating, sperm production constraints, male selectivity, mutual mate choice, female ornamental traits, and changing sex roles depending on environmental/social context. Sexual selection research accelerated with the publication of Trivers' 1972 work on parental investment. Trivers drew on Bateman's 1948 study; Bateman found more variation in the number of mates obtained by male fruit flies, thus leading to higher selection on males. Most alternatives appeared at the same time as research framed by the classic view; however, these alternatives did not inform the general direction of research until the past decade.

Using Longino's Critical Contextual Empiricism (CCE), we used the waning dominance of the Trivers/Bateman paradigm to explore how changing rational and social factors impact scientific knowledge. Scholars and researchers within and crossing between feminist science studies and biological research critiqued some of the main assumptions behind these theoretical frameworks starting in the seventies. Yet these critiques generally appeared outside of the mainstream journals and venues. For example, they were typically published in venues focused on female animals, on feminist audiences, or on less dominant taxa (e.g., fish). Within the last decade, these critiques have begun appearing in mainstream journals, and prominent researchers now propose to broaden the definition of sexual selection. We used CCE to examine how integrated social and rational factors led to an increase in uptake of alternative views.

Author(s): Micha Kilburn

Title: The Physics Pipeline from K-12 to Tenure

Abstract: The lack of diversity in physics is a known problem, and yet efforts to change the demographics have only had minor effects during the last decade. I will explain some of the hidden barriers that dissuade underrepresented minorities in becoming physicists using a framework borrowed from sociology, Maslow's hierarchy of needs. I will draw from current research at the undergraduate to faculty levels over a variety of STEM fields that are also addressing a lack of diversity. I will also provide analysis from outreach programs to understand the outlook for current K-12 students in becoming physicists. Specifically, I will present results from camp surveys about students' attitudes towards science and what kinds of people "look like scientists". I will also present results from analysis of teacher recommendations with regards to implicit bias for our high school summer program.

Author(s): Chris Kramer

Title: World-Travelling, Double Consciousness, and Laughter

Abstract: In this paper I borrow from Maria Lugones' work on playful "world-travelling" and W.E.B. Du Bois' notion of "double consciousness" to make the case that humor can facilitate an openness and cooperative attitude among an otherwise closed, even adversarial audience. I focus on what I call "subversive" humor, that which is employed by or on behalf of those who have been continually marginalized. When effectively used, such humor can foster the inclination and even desire to listen to others and, if only for brief moments, adopt their point of view. To be able to see oneself as others see you can also be a desirable capacity, because along with such multidimensional seeing comes an epistemic advantage lacking in those who have no need nor desire to see as others do, especially if the vision of the others happens to be from below where one perceives that the promises of our explicit ideals are constantly being implicitly broken. This is a descriptive not prescriptive study of the art of border-crossing through subversive humor. Such humor is aesthetic, pleasurable in and of itself, and not amenable to scientific dissection. But it is also a skill that can be honed into a powerful tool of persuasion in circumstances where arguments and scientific data, e.g., are less effective. The latter are reputedly (or notoriously) objective, straightforward, intentionally abstracting from particulars in the effort to avoid bias, emotionality, and subjectivity. These direct approaches have their place, but they are ill suited by themselves to raise consciousness about the lived experiences of those suffering under systemic oppression and even less effective at world travelling. Subversive humor encourages audiences, especially those who contribute to what Jean Harvey calls "civilized oppression", to playfully travel across worlds and "tarry along" (Yancy) with the perspectives of the marginalized.

Author(s): Vanessa Anastasia Lamont

Title: Crossing Boundaries: An Intersectional, Cross-Disciplinary Solution to Essentialism in Standpoint Theory

Abstract: "This paper explores solutions to the problem of essentialism in standpoint theory and its applications. Though standpoint theory does consider common structures and shared experiences to avoid the issue of essentialism, standpoint theory fails to adequately address essentialism with respect to variation in knowers' individual abilities and characteristics.

Unitary, multiple, and intersectional approaches to intersectionality in feminist philosophy are considered using the framework of mono-, multi-, inter-, and transdisciplinarity. The analogy drawn between these approaches and the degrees of disciplinary integration assists in clarifying their similarities and differences in terms of structure and content towards a more comprehensive understanding of how epistemically relevant aspects of identity might be combined into social location.

This paper draws on conceptions of difference from academic disciplines, industry, and non-academic communities. Practices and examples from feminist epistemology, universal design, and disability studies are used as studies of the consequences of applying the unitary, multiple, and intersectional approaches to understanding diverse knowers, their social locations, critical awareness, and resulting standpoints. This analysis concludes that while unitary, multiple, and intersectional approaches, like different forms of disciplinary integration, have benefits and

limitations in certain cases, the intersectional approach is most effective in generating a richer theory of standpoint and social location while rejecting essentialism.

The paper responds to criticisms of both essentialism and relativism regarding Wylie's conception of standpoint theory and this paper's proposed extension, and suggests that an integration of the principles and practices of intersectionality may enhance standpoint theory and its applications, providing a greater critical, constructive, and actionable understanding of epistemically relevant areas of difference."

Author(s): Mary Jeanne Larrabe

Title: Epistemologies of Naming

Abstract: "There is a need in academic forms of discourse for naming things—events, persons, or whatever. This connects in part to the need to construct concepts that work neatly in naming such things, as well as the categories to which they belong. But there has also been a need on the part of many for a simplicity of ordered concepts both for the level of things (what philosophy calls real entities) and of the categories. This simplicity often shows in the development of binary concepts or names. Their simplicity is such that one can readily see how the binaries relate to one another and often neatly divide classes or categories into mutually exclusive subcategories named by the binaries. And since the binaries supposedly function as opposite of one another, they are fairly readily defined in relation to one another. Hence: white and black, up and down, rich and poor, male and female . . . oops!

The last two binaries, female and male, have been challenged throughout the history of the second wave and on of feminist theorizing across a range of disciplines in the humanities and the social and natural sciences. They have been severely critiqued both when seen as the names of the two "sexes" and the two "genders," as have the terms which earlier functioned as binaries, 'sex' and 'gender'. In particular, the more recent naming, in terms of feminist theorizing, is 'trans', which already has developed its own complex history. My paper looks at this history in philosophy, activism, and life writing in order to discover the value of the trans movement for any discipline, especially those with a history of binaries not grounded in the lived realities of persons' lives. The informing question is how do we know how to name. "

Author(s): Ethan Czuy Levine

Title: Locating the Problem of Sexual Violence: Definitions, Survey Design, and Sampling Strategies in Quantitative Research

Abstract: Quantitative data have played a major role in sexual violence prevention for decades in the United States and Canada. In the 1980s, reports that 1 in 4 college women had experienced completed or attempted rape transformed rape from an individual problem into an epidemic in public consciousness. More recently, reports that 1 in 5 women experience sexual assault in college in the U.S. prompted federal intervention into campus sexual assault. Few have disputed the need to address violence on campus. Perhaps fewer have disputed the ongoing reliance on statistical data for policy design, or the interpretation of "1 in 5" as alarmingly high. However, some scholars and

advocates have challenged the widespread emphasis on students and consequent inattention to other populations, such as incarcerated persons and queer communities. This research draws on two concepts from the sociology of scientific knowledge to investigate the scope and implications of varying approaches to quantifying sexual violence: credibility struggles, including strategies whereby researchers defend their work and discredit critics; and agnotology, or the production of ignorance, which may arise whenever researchers' and other knowledge producers' commitment to a particular approach obscures other perspectives. Data come from three sources: content analysis of scientific journal abstracts (N=1813), to document dominant trends in the scientific conceptualization of sexual violence; in-depth, qualitative analysis of five incidence/prevalence studies with varying definitions and populations; and popular and scientific reception to these five studies, as measured through academic citations and press coverage. Analyses demonstrate that scientists' methodological decisions may serve to locate the problem of sexual violence in a range of populations and locations. Such decisions have implications that extend well beyond scientists' individual careers and disciplines, and may ultimately impact funding distribution, policy and program design, and popular and institutional understandings of sexual violence. Quantitative data have played a major role in sexual violence prevention for decades in the United States and Canada. In the 1980s, reports that 1 in 4 college women had experienced completed or attempted rape transformed rape from an individual problem into an epidemic in public consciousness. More recently, reports that 1 in 5 women experience sexual assault in college in the U.S. prompted federal intervention into campus sexual assault. Few have disputed the need to address violence on campus. Perhaps fewer have disputed the ongoing reliance on statistical data for policy design, or the interpretation of "1 in 5" as alarmingly high. However, some scholars and advocates have challenged the widespread emphasis on students and consequent inattention to other populations, such as incarcerated persons and queer communities. This research draws on two concepts from the sociology of scientific knowledge to investigate the scope and implications of varying approaches to quantifying sexual violence: credibility struggles, including strategies whereby researchers defend their work and discredit critics; and agnotology, or the production of ignorance, which may arise whenever researchers' and other knowledge producers' commitment to a particular approach obscures other perspectives. Data come from three sources: content analysis of scientific journal abstracts (N=1813), to document dominant trends in the scientific conceptualization of sexual violence; in-depth, qualitative analysis of five incidence/prevalence studies with varying definitions and populations; and popular and scientific reception to these five studies, as measured through academic citations and press coverage. Analyses demonstrate that scientists' methodological decisions may serve to locate the problem of sexual violence in a range of populations and locations. Such decisions have implications that extend well beyond scientists' individual careers and disciplines, and may ultimately impact funding distribution, policy and program design, and popular and institutional understandings of sexual violence.

Author(s): Nabina Liebow

Title: What are Microaggressions?: How Philosophical Analysis Can Support Social Scientific Research

Abstract: “Over the past decade, microaggressions have garnered much attention from social science researchers and scholars. While this research can empower individuals from marginalized groups and also help provide valuable insight into how oppression is manifested, sustained, and generated, it ultimately suffers from a weak understanding of what “microaggressions” are. This lack of clarity has contributed to a growing sentiment that microaggressions are not worth the social and academic interest they have generated. My aim in this paper is to introduce and defend a more conceptually adequate account of the term “microaggression.” This account will illuminate the reasons why these phenomena deserve attention from philosophers, social science researchers, and the public and will also provide a solid foundation for future research on microaggressions.

On my account, one of the central, defining features of microaggressions is the way in which they convey bias. In particular, microaggressions are acts or behaviors that implicitly (but not explicitly) signal prejudices or biases. I argue that the full extent of the biases signaled by microaggressive behavior can only be understood with reference to patterns of prejudice, disadvantage, and oppression in the broader social context. In my presentation I will first raise important criticisms of the traditional account of microaggressions. Next I will introduce and explain my account. I conclude by drawing out the ways in which my account provides a strong framework for future research. Over the past decade, microaggressions have garnered much attention from social science researchers and scholars. While this research can empower individuals from marginalized groups and also help provide valuable insight into how oppression is manifested, sustained, and generated, it ultimately suffers from a weak understanding of what “microaggressions” are. This lack of clarity has contributed to a growing sentiment that microaggressions are not worth the social and academic interest they have generated. My aim in this paper is to introduce and defend a more conceptually adequate account of the term “microaggression.” This account will illuminate the reasons why these phenomena deserve attention from philosophers, social science researchers, and the public and will also provide a solid foundation for future research on microaggressions.

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Author(s): Maureen Linker

Title: In Defense of Empathy as Self-Knowledge

Abstract: “Empathy has played an important role in feminist theory challenging both the epistemological ideal of the unfeeling Cartesian cogito as well as traditional ontological accounts of the self as free, rational, and autonomous. A range of feminist theories beginning in the 1980s and 1990s highlighted the importance of empathy and its component affective elements for increasing knowledge of women’s mutual oppression and making apparent the matrix of domination (e.g. Mohanty 1988; Lugones 1990; Meyers 1994; Tong, 1997; Collins, 2000). Yet in more recent feminist

work, skeptical doubts have emerged regarding the role of empathy in feminist liberatory practices (e.g. Bailey, 2001, Doezema, 2001, Hemmings, 2012). Some theorists, particularly those working in transnational feminism, have even argued that a feminist focus on empathy can reinforce existing inequalities by encouraging those in positions of social advantage to falsely believe that they understand the lived experiences of those who face social oppression (Pedwell, 2007).

In this paper, I offer a defense of empathy for feminist theory while addressing the importance of these recent critiques. I argue 1) that many of the skeptical challenges to empathy problematically construe it as a method for understanding another's affective experience. I argue instead that empathy should be understood as a process for coming to know how one's self is socially constructed through the eyes of another and 2) that empathy so construed can only proceed in contexts where a speaker's (or speakers) intent is to accurately report the content of their experience to a hearer (or hearers) whose objective involves the acquisition of new information. These contexts include classroom discussions, civic engagement and community organizing, dialogues promoting professional standards, as well as non-fictional and multi-media personal narratives. I show that many of the skeptical objections to empathy rely on cases outside of these relevant contexts. Empathy has played an important role in feminist theory challenging both the epistemological ideal of the unfeeling Cartesian cogito as well as traditional ontological accounts of the self as free, rational, and autonomous. A range of feminist theories beginning in the 1980s and 1990s highlighted the importance of empathy and its component affective elements for increasing knowledge of women's mutual oppression and making apparent the matrix of domination (e.g. Mohanty 1988; Lugones 1990; Meyers 1994; Tong, 1997; Collins, 2000). Yet in more recent feminist work, skeptical doubts have emerged regarding the role of empathy in feminist liberatory practices (e.g. Bailey, 2001, Doezema, 2001, Hemmings, 2012). Some theorists, particularly those working in transnational feminism, have even argued that a feminist focus on empathy can reinforce existing inequalities by encouraging those in positions of social advantage to falsely believe that they understand the lived experiences of those who face social oppression (Pedwell, 2007).

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Author(s): C. Phoebe Lostroh

Title: The emerging disciplines of synthetic biology and genome editing: questions from a feminist molecular biologist

Abstract: “Synthetic biology is use of artificial DNA synthesized through organic chemistry to create new cells such as Syn3.0 (“Synthia”) using 531,490 basepairs of synthetic DNA. Genome editing instead creates novel organisms using genetic engineering techniques that are faster, cheaper, more precise, and applicable to more organisms than older methods. A popular possibility is “de-extinction” such as creation of a new organism that is an edited elephant with woolly mammoth sequences introduced into its genome.

Synthetic biology and genome editing have much in common beyond simply illustrating the triumphant march of reductionism. Both are driven by a frontier mentality that uses the language of conquest, a lack of regulatory control, and narratives of unbridled human potential. The possibility of financial gain may also be especially engaging for young biomedical scientists, who face unprecedentedly terrible long-term employment prospects. Also, the cishet white male giants in each field share a flair for talking big, competing with each other, and making money from biotechnologies.

The two fields raise questions for a feminist molecular biologist such as myself. Do they merely provide extreme examples of nature controlled by science, with all of the gendered associations to unpack? Will the technologies inevitably be used to exacerbate inequality? On the other hand, are there feminist goals such as eradication of malaria that could be accomplished? Is there something intrinsically queer about a synthetic cell or edited cells? Could diverse women be empowered by employing synthetic biology and genome editing in pursuit of their intellectual or other interests? If the two technologies do bring about a brave new world, could it be beneficial to have feminists involved? The paper will explore these and related questions from the perspective of a feminist practitioner who routinely uses synthetic DNA and genetic engineering in her own research laboratory.”

Author(s): Emily Katherine Maiden

Title: Integration through Separation: Improving the Cantonment Process for Female Ex-Combatants in Africa

Abstract: Since the passing of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1325 in October 2000, states recovering from violence have worked to integrate females into peacemaking and peacebuilding processes. In Africa today, females make up as much as 30 percent of all fighting forces. Unfortunately, many African states struggle to craft policies that properly integrate these female ex-combatants into disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programs. Why aren’t more women participating in DDR? Are they simply not interested? If they are interested, what are the barriers restricting their access? In this paper, I analyze a number of recent cases in Africa—including Sierra Leone, Liberia, Burundi, and South Sudan—to examine ways in which DDR policy can be improved to provide females with better, safer access to the cantonment sites where DDR takes place. One way to increase the participation of female ex-combatants would be to offer separate cantonment facilities for males and females. Unless the cantonment process is improved, the threat posed by recidivating ex-combatants will remain high.

Author(s): Carole McCann

Title: Gender, Eugenics, and Population Control

Abstract: In the one hundred years since she coined the term birth control, Margaret Sanger has come to represent both the fight for women's reproductive rights and the eugenic logic of population control practices across the globe. While not contesting the fact of the eugenic logic of population control, this paper investigates what is obscured when Sanger's commitment to eugenics is indexed as 'the cause' of the racialized coloniality of population control. That is, it examines the largely successful effort by eugenically inclined demographers who used gendered claims of scientific objectivity to capture authority for knowledge about human fertility and its aggregate effects on population growth. Those claims successfully separated population knowledge from reproductive politics, securing the credibility of population facts. The paper pushes feminist science studies boundary concept of gender in new directions to tease out interconnections of race, nation, and gender politics that complicate our understanding of feminist successes, failures, and potential futures.

Author(s): Nancy McHugh

Title: Ending Life: Incarceration, health, and epistemic injustice

Abstract: "End of life issues are frequently fraught with a narrow range of choices based on one's economic, social, health and familial situation. Yet for a select population, ill and/or aging prison inmates, this range of choices is even narrower. This is compounded because people who are incarcerated tend to experience age-related debilitating illness at a younger age than people living outside of prison (Wick and Zanni 2009). Fifteen U.S. states have experienced a 40-50% increase in their percentage of inmates who are 55 years or older (Vestal 2014). Furthermore, the number of younger people who are incarcerated with potentially terminal illnesses, such as H.I.V./AIDS or Hepatitis C, which in some cases are contracted in prison, is also increasing (Maschi, Marmo, and Han 2014).

This paper combines work in epistemologies of ignorance (Mills 1997, Tuana 2013), epistemic injustice (Anderson 2012, Fricker 2007, LoCI-Wittenberg University Writing Group 2016, McHugh forthcoming, Medina 2014), and the capabilities approach (Nussbaum, 2000; Sen 1997, 2011; Venkatapuram 2011) with research in carceral studies, medical, philosophical and sociological, (e.g., Alexander 2010, Foucault 1977, Guenther 2013, Maschi et al 2014, Wick et al 2009), to argue that U.S. culture and social policy has used epistemic institutional injustice to: 1. Generate a lack of knowledge and a systemic social misunderstanding around the health needs of people who are incarcerated. 2. Shaped a carceral system that generates "institutionalized" inmates who are poorly positioned to advocate for their health needs. 3. Used seemingly humane practices, such as "medical pardoning" to release the state from its obligations to the health needs of formerly incarcerated people. 4. Misrepresented the health needs, health treatments, vulnerability, and public threat of older and ill people who are incarcerated. 5. Ignored the detrimental role that long-term prison incarcerated plays in the health of inmates."

Author(s): Bronwyn McIlroy-Young

Title: Gender Minorities and Feminist Epistemology: Why discussions of gender should privilege the voices of trans and non-binary individuals

Abstract: In this paper, I argue that gender non-binary and trans individuals have a unique and valuable insight into the function and effects of hegemonic gender, and that including their voices would greatly enrich discussions of gender in Feminist Epistemology. My work builds from Sandy Stone's "The Empire Strikes Back: A Post-Transsexual Manifesto" (1987/1992), which calls for "post-operative" trans people to embrace their identities as "transsexual", rather than erasing their past and "disappearing" into a normative performance of their new gender. My paper continues from Stone's work to investigate the epistemic consequences of claiming a disruptive gender identity, specifically through the application of Socially Situated Knowledge. I contend that living a marginalized gender identity necessitates a heightened awareness of one's own gender, as well as an active investment in understanding the origins, effects, and enforcement of normative gender. In this way, trans and non-binary people have the potential to gain a privileged epistemic standpoint, as defined by Alison Wylie in "Why Standpoint Matters" (2003), in discussions of gender. Gender minorities are epistemically advantaged in so far as they gain knowledge that is less accessible to cisgender people whose dominant social positioning never necessitates critical engagement with binary gender. I then argue that the radical change in social location entailed by a transition in gender identity provides access to a new arsenal of epistemic resources for comprehending gender. I will use the writing of trans musician and author Rae Spoon to demonstrate how movements across and beyond the gender binary can result in a privileged understanding of gender. My arguments are applied to Lorraine Code's seminal work "Is the Sex of the Knower Epistemologically Significant?", as an example of how cisnormative assumptions entrenched in the paradigm constitute a limiting and oppressive understanding of gender and can lead to consequential flaws in theory.

Author(s): Eden Medina

Title: Science and Memory in Post-Pinochet Chile

Abstract: "In the 1990s, the Chilean government formed a team of forensic scientists to identify the skeletons of those the Chilean military killed and buried anonymously during the Pinochet dictatorship (1973-1990). This paper focuses on the 126 skeletons exhumed from one burial site—Patio 29—a lot in the General Cemetery in Santiago where the military buried hundreds of bodies in graves marked N.N. (*nomen nescio*). Chilean forensic scientists working in the Medical- Legal Institute were able to identify 96 of the bodies exhumed and provide family members with a sense of closure. However, scientific certainty soon became government error. In 2006, the Chilean government announced that at least 48 of the 96 bodies had been erroneously identified. Most of the blame for these errors fell on the shoulders of the two female scientists who had conducted the identifications at the Medical Legal Institute. Critics said the women had been too close to the families of the disappeared to make objective identifications and that their political commitment to finding and identifying the disappeared had caused them to reach beyond the limits of their scientific capability.

This paper explores how the scientists' proximity to memories of Chile's human rights violations shaped the perceived legitimacy of their scientific work and the role of that work in Chile's reparation processes. It also explores the ways that this proximity contributed positively to the process of identification, in addition to addressing the critiques that were later raised. The paper draws from interviews with Chilean forensic scientists, press accounts, and archival documents. It traces changing attitudes towards scientific objectivity within the Medical Legal Service, including changing views on what the relationship should be between scientists and the families of the disappeared. Finally, it probes the relationship of memory and science by studying how memories of human rights crimes shape scientific work and how instances of scientific error in the context of human rights cases shape public memory of the science and scientists involved."

Author(s): Letitia Meynell

Title: Sexual Configurations Theory as a feminist successor science

Abstract: "The idea of a feminist successor science has been around for a least as long as feminist philosophy of science and arguably longer. Among various feminist successor research programs, Sari van Anders' Sexual Configurations Theory (SCT) (2015) stands out as not only having a potential breadth of scope and influence that few, if any, other feminist research programs can boast, but also as deeply and explicitly informed by feminist theory and committed to feminist ends. In this presentation, I will draw attention to these features.

SCT is intended to serve as a replacement to traditional ways of classifying human subjects in terms of their sex, gender and sexual orientation in both research and clinical applications. As such it is a measurement tool that is expected to provide a robust, manageable and comprehensive way of accurately classifying individuals. Although primarily meant for social neuroendocrinology, I will argue that it has potentially a much broader application. As a form of measurement it will profoundly influence not only the results of those studies that employ it but even the formulation of research questions. SCT is explicitly and unapologetically informed by feminist and queer theory, decentering not only heterosexuality and dyadic partner preferences, but distinguishing sex and gender in both subjects and their preferred partners, eroticism and nurturance, as well as sexual orientation, identity and status. Thus SCT is profoundly anti-essentialist and anti-reductionist, and in effect takes an intersectional approach to these multiple aspects of sexual configuration. Finally, the theory itself is also intended to be accountable and useful to those it classifies and van Anders explicitly identifies various ways in which she intends the classification system to "be useful for self-knowledge and feminist and queer empowerment and alliance building" (2015, 1177). "

Author(s): Claudia Murphy, Catherine Hundleby, Audrey Yap

Title: Workshop: Resources for Indigenizing Education: Personal, Political, Scholarly

Abstract: "Resources for Indigenizing Education: Personal, Political, Scholarly

In the fall of 2015, the workshop participants took a MOOC called Reconciliation through Indigenous Education through the University of British Columbia. In addition to the regular coursework we also met weekly in a google hangout to discuss the course materials and any philosophical import.

The goals of our workshop are to further develop the understanding and practices developed during our MOOC discussions. This includes some brainstorming about and sharing of resources for incorporating elements of indigenous education into post-secondary curricula, especially in philosophy.

Rationale:

The Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada (TRC) released a final report and recommendations for a path towards reconciliation in June 2015. A part of the recommendation is that education must be transformed so as to promote reconciliation. “Education must remedy the gaps in historical knowledge that perpetuate ignorance and racism... Canadians must learn about the history and legacy of residential schools in ways that change both minds and hearts.” (Canada’s Residential Schools, p 117)

The calls to action from the TRC include requiring curriculum focused on indigenous peoples and histories in K-12 education in Canada as well as the teaching of indigenous ways of knowing in aboriginal schools. Others have called for similar action in the US.

Workshop topics will include

- a) Exploring personal and professional colonial histories in relation to indigenous peoples.
- b) Learning about the colonial and current realities of indigenous peoples
- c) Sharing and developing resources and practices for including indigenous ways of knowing in the college curriculum (not limited to, but including specific discussion of opportunities and obstacles in the discipline of philosophy)

During the session we will compile a list of resources and practices for indigenous education to be shared with participants.

Canada’s Residential Schools: Reconciliation Volume 6, McGill-Queens University Press, 2015”

Author(s): Madeleine Pape

Title: The Fairest of Them All: Super Women, Experts, and Sex Difference in the Court of Arbitration for Sport

Abstract: When the international governing body for the sport of athletics (the IAAF) introduced their Hyperandrogenism Regulations in 2011, they stated that “men typically achieve better performances in sport because they benefit from higher levels of androgens than women.” In 2015, the international Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) ruled that such a statement was not supported by scientific fact, granting Indian sprinter Dutee Chand the right to compete. Testifying in support of Chand were expert witnesses from various scientific fields, some of whom drew heavily on feminist critiques of the science of sex difference. I also served as a witness for Chand, as a sociologist and elite athlete who rejected the claims of the IAAF to be defending “fair play” and the interests of women in track-and-field. Chand’s was a victory for all female athletes but a precarious one, since the Regulations may be reinstated in the future.

In this paper I present my analysis of the court proceedings. I argue that the case was decided on the weakness of the IAAF’s science, rather than the strength of Chand’s, because of the particular kind of science recognized by the Panel. Overlooked by the Panel, however, was the un-level and gendered playing field upon which the hearing took place. Furthermore, I argue that the Panel

endorsed the decoupling of “gender” from “sex:” while they were willing to recognize all self-identifying women as “women,” the “female athlete” was treated as a separate biological category. Thus although science cannot define womanhood, it was permitted to determine the (normative) biological limits of the female athlete. I suggest that the willingness of the Panel and the IAAF to advance a restrictive, “scientific,” and gendered account of “fair play” has important implications for which women are recognized as “real” women in the world of sport.

Author(s): Sophia Pavlos

Title: Pleasure Politics and the Subversive Power of Black Female Sexuality

Abstract: In this paper I will look at the way in which black women’s sexualities have been constructed, paying particular attention to the wide range of sexualized stereotypes that have been attributed to black women, from the asexual mammy to the hypersexual jezebel. Recent work in ‘Pleasure Politics’ seeks to reframe existing narratives about black female sexuality by positioning black women’s sexual agency and engagement with pleasure as viable theoretical paradigms. I will specifically look at Mireille Miller-Young’s work on black women in the porn industry, and Treva B. Johnson’s work on black female pop stars, both of whom argue that black women are able to use and manipulate their sexualities for liberatory purposes. While I am highly sympathetic to Miller-Young and Johnson’s similar goals of emphasizing the importance of the erotic and pleasure in black women’s lives, it is not clear that black women’s sexuality is socially constructed in such a way that centering black women’s assertions of sexual subjectivity has the impact that Miller-Young and Johnson propose. This is because the (often contradictory) controlling images of black female sexuality present particular challenges for materially and discursively subverting the harmful sexual tropes attributed to black women. While I agree that asserting the value of pleasure and a healthy erotic are important tools for liberation from oppressive sexual norms, I argue that it is less clear how these contestations will start to subvert norms in a way that is noticeable to the general public, and therefore has an impact on the collective hermeneutic resources used to understand black women’s sexual agency.

Author(s): Lara Arielle Phillips

Title: Overlooked Genius: Perspectives from Teaching Physics at the Westville Correctional Facility

Abstract: The issue of representation or lack thereof of women and people of color in the physics community is well documented. The intersection of these two populations is even more underrepresented. The AIP Statistical Research Center found that, “from 1997-2003, 20 African-American women and 19 Hispanic-American women graduated with physics Ph.D.s”. Paradoxically, the experience of teaching physics to men at a correctional facility highlighted key issues that have broad implications for overcoming the implicit bias hurdles that keep the physics community from finding and benefitting from the bright minds that are too easily overlooked. I will go over solutions touching on mindful mentorship, the gap between well-intentioned and effective support, and the importance of not equating increased representation with having the tools in place to support the next generation of underrepresented physicists.

Author(s): Victoria Pitts-Taylor

Title: The Paradoxes of Feminist Materialisms

Abstract: This talk situates ‘The Brain’s Body: Neuroscience and Corporeal Politics’ in the context of feminist materialisms (or ‘new’ materialisms), feminist epistemologies, and materialist theories of gender performativity. She highlights lived differences with regard to race, sex/gender and sexuality, and disability, raised in the text. She addresses how feminist understandings of these differences complicate and sometimes challenge efforts to include embodiment in understandings of cognition and affect within ‘social neuroscience’ and neurophilosophy.

Author(s): Gaile Pohlhaus Jr.

Title: Knowing with Philosophers

Abstract: “Feminist epistemologists have examined the sociality of knowing in a variety of ways not all of which are the same. Moreover, some of the distinct ways in which knowing is social can work in tandem to produce particular types of ignorance, such as willful hermeneutical ignorance, a kind of ignorance in which those in dominant social positions refuse to learn and participate in socially shared resources for knowing the world as it impacts those who are non-dominantly positioned. Such accounts recommend that we think of knowing as ‘knowing with’ and pay attention to those with whom a knower knows. In this paper, I ask whether and how this kind of attention can illuminate what it is knowers are doing when we engage in philosophical knowing and whether such attention might further illuminate the causes and costs of the overwhelming whiteness and maleness of the discipline of philosophy as well as those with whom professional philosophers know. In light of my analysis, I recommend that in addition to the types of sociality developed by feminist epistemologists thus far we ought also to pay attention to epistemic movement so that we begin to consider what sorts of things move philosophers epistemically speaking, what sorts of things do not, and why. I begin to develop a vocabulary that attends to epistemic movement and utilize this vocabulary in order to call attention to particular philosophical habits of mind and to make recommendations for expanding philosophical attention in ways that speak to concerns about the diversity of who practices philosophy and with whom philosophers know/think. “

Author(s): Vitaly Pronskikh

Title: Epistemic Equity in Scientific Collaborations: The Case For Megascience

Abstract: “Large scientific collaborations in Big Science have been brought to the attention of philosophers for a number of reasons. The concept of megascience is often associated with a kind of Big Science (particularly high-energy physics) that emerged in the 1970s and is characterized by the growth of chains of experiments representing long-term traditions. As the main reason for the growth of the experimental chains, it has been pointed to the opposition between growing scales and costs of research projects in high-energy physics and funding limitations. Another reason is the controversy between the very nature of the classic experimentation as an effort of an individual

mind on the one hand and the requirement of teamwork entailing a division of the epistemic labor on the other.

I argue that the epistemic stratification of collaborations and the absence of symmetry in the access to data production and data analysis among members were among the causes of slowing the advancement in knowledge production. I suggest that epistemic justice and equity among collaboration members with respect to access to all aspects of knowledge production are not only ethical values but also epistemic ones because they warrant more progress in science and increase the production of more reliable knowledge through collaborations. I suggest that the formation of experimental chains in megascience is grounded not so much in the limited funding for research as in the absence of interest in the community to the developing of new accelerators and detectors due to the epistemic discontinuity in the scheme of experiment proposed in this work. I suggest that the epistemic equity is an imperative for megascience, provided that the epistemic status of knowledge is to be deemed on a par with the classical one.”

Author(s): Andrea Lucrecia Richardson

Title: U.S. Justice System, Incarceration, and the Structural Disenfranchisement of Women of Intersectional Identities

Abstract: Though the United States of America (U.S.) has a reputation as an all-inclusive, “melting pot” nation, it is clear that certain people are given preferential treatment in society and under the law over others. People of color in the U.S. often face injustice and disenfranchisement: from enslavement, to the era of Jim Crow, to now, during the rise of what scholars call ‘The New Jim Crow,’ mass incarceration. Black people are incarcerated at a rate almost six times higher than their White counterparts and are given longer, harsher sentences for the same offenses. Because of a national perception that attributes criminality to people of color, these communities are often more heavily and more harshly policed. These race-based disparities have been largely discussed and investigated in respect to how they affect men; however, women, whose incarceration rates have increased over 800 percent in the past thirty years, are largely unrepresented in discourse. In addition to mass incarceration, women of color also face the burden of having their sexualities policed and criminalized; and, many women, especially poor women of color, find their reproductive rights jeopardized by the state. Victims of sexual harassment, sexual assault, and rape are often ignored or are even persecuted in courts, never seeing justice. In this paper, I argue that the current state of the legal system allows for the systematic exploitation of and violence against women of color living in the U.S. Through an intersectional framework, I explore some of the unique plights of women of various marginalized identities.

Author(s): Stacey Ritz

Title: Experimental thinking outside the (male/female) boxes: Theoretical and practical complexities of addressing sex/gender in basic biomedical research

Abstract: In recent decades the need to address sex/gender in biomedical research has become increasingly apparent, and biomedical granting agencies in several jurisdictions have been mandating

the consideration of sex/gender as a prerequisite for funding. However, the ways that the constructs of sex/gender are taken up, manifested, and operationalized in biomedical research are not inherently or necessarily liberatory, feminist, or progressive – indeed, using essentialist and determinist understandings of sex/gender to inform biomedical research can be regressive and even undermine the project of health equity. In this paper, I will focus on the tendency of biomedical research to treat sex/gender as a categorical independent variable in experimental work – that is, to demarcate concrete boundaries between categories (usually male/female) place subjects or data points decisively in one of these categories. This is only partly due to a dearth of sophisticated theorizing about sex/gender in mainstream biomedical discourses. I will discuss how the experimental paradigm itself fundamentally drives such categorization, and the practical and material aspects of laboratory practice that impinge on experimental researchers' ability to operationalize non-categorical constructs of sex/gender, from my perspective as a feminist and experimental laboratory-based scientist. Using examples from cell, animal, tissue, and human subject-based research, I explore some of the implications of treating the complex construct of sex/gender as an independent variable and what this might mean for the greater project of gender, equity, and health. Attending to these questions is a crucial prerequisite for appropriately addressing sex/gender in biomedical research, because if we accept the current use of simplistic binary female/male comparisons the resulting knowledge will not only fail to produce greater equity, but may in fact entrench inequity and pre-empt the kinds of nuanced thinking required to disrupt the hegemonic discourses of gender in biomedicine. In recent decades the need to address sex/gender in biomedical research has become increasingly apparent, and biomedical granting agencies in several jurisdictions have been mandating the consideration of sex/gender as a prerequisite for funding. However, the ways that the constructs of sex/gender are taken up, manifested, and operationalized in biomedical research are not inherently or necessarily liberatory, feminist, or progressive – indeed, using essentialist and determinist understandings of sex/gender to inform biomedical research can be regressive and even undermine the project of health equity. In this paper, I will focus on the tendency of biomedical research to treat sex/gender as a categorical independent variable in experimental work – that is, to demarcate concrete boundaries between categories (usually male/female) place subjects or data points decisively in one of these categories. This is only partly due to a dearth of sophisticated theorizing about sex/gender in mainstream biomedical discourses. I will discuss how the experimental paradigm itself fundamentally drives such categorization, and the practical and material aspects of laboratory practice that impinge on experimental researchers' ability to operationalize non-categorical constructs of sex/gender, from my perspective as a feminist and experimental laboratory-based scientist. Using examples from cell, animal, tissue, and human subject-based research, I explore some of the implications of treating the complex construct of sex/gender as an independent variable and what this might mean for the greater project of gender, equity, and health. Attending to these questions is a crucial prerequisite for appropriately addressing sex/gender in biomedical research, because if we accept the current use of simplistic binary female/male comparisons the resulting knowledge will not only fail to produce greater equity, but may in fact entrench inequity and pre-empt the kinds of nuanced thinking required to disrupt the hegemonic discourses of gender in biomedicine.

Author(s): Dorothy Roberts

Title: Gender, Race, and Dangerous Mothers in the Old and New Bioscience

Abstract: Biosocial science, including eugenics, evolutionary explanations for gender inequality, and biological definitions of race, historically has supported unjust social hierarchies by claiming they are biologically determined. Under this biosocial paradigm, mothers have been blamed for transferring inequality to future generations by passing defective innate traits to their offspring. Casting mothers as dangerous reproducers reinforced patriarchal and racist ideologies and justified surveillance, control, and punishment of women's childbearing. Rather than explain social inequality as biologically predestined through inheritance, an emerging biosocial science, including epigenetics and the neuroscience of poverty, investigates how social inequality produces disparate biological outcomes. But does the new biosocial science replicate or contest the role of dangerous mothers in justifications for social injustice?

Author(s): Maryam Rokhdeh

Title: To Be Announced

Author(s): Kristina Rolin

Title: If Diversity Is Epistemically Beneficial, To Whom Is It Beneficial?

Abstract: "In recent years, the debate on the epistemic benefits of diversity has entered the mainstream in philosophy of science (see, e.g., Alexander et al. 2015; De Langhe 2014; Muldoon 2013; Thoma 2015). I argue that this development poses new challenges to feminist philosophy of science (see also Fehr 2011).

Three arguments are often cited in support of the view that diversity is epistemically beneficial. One argument claims that diversity generates and maintains a distribution of research efforts among different research programs (Kitcher 1990, 1993; Solomon 2001). Another argument claims that diversity is a source of critical perspectives which can improve scientific knowledge in many ways (Longino 1990, 2002). Yet another argument claims that diversity is a source of scientific creativity (Solomon 2009).

While I do not object to these arguments, I provide a critical analysis of the ways diversity is understood in recent debates. I argue that a diversity of idiosyncratic research styles, skills, and talents (Solomon 2006), a diversity of theoretical approaches (Zollman 2010), and a diversity of research strategies (Weisberg and Muldoon 2009) can be realized without implementing a diversity of social locations in science.

I suggest that feminist philosophers keep emphasizing the diversity of social locations that track systemic social inequalities, such as race, gender, and class positions (see, e.g., Crasnow 2014; Harding 2004, 2015; Intemann 2010, 2011; Longino 1990, 2002; Rolin 2016; Wylie 2003, 2011, 2012). Not just any kind of diversity is epistemically fruitful when we aim to challenge relations of power in the society as well as in the academic world."

Author(s): Phyllis Rooney

Title: Adversarial Argumentation and Diversity in Science

Abstract: “Adversarial Argumentation and Diversity in Science

Discussions about diversity in philosophy have focused (among other things) on the role of adversarial argumentation as that is regularly practiced in the discipline. This practice has, for instance, been noted as a possible factor contributing to the lower numbers of women in philosophy. I examine the way in which the issue about adversarial argumentation can avoid problematic assumptions (for example, assumptions about women being more delicate) by constructively developing discussion of the issue in two directions.

First, the epistemological aspect of adversarial argumentation needs to be more fully engaged. That is, the debate needs to pay more attention to the ways in which adversarial forms of argumentation do or do not contribute to the epistemological goal of arriving at truth and knowledge (or better knowledge), or better understanding or explanation. Second, the debate needs to pay more attention to a broader understanding of diversity—that is, diversity with respect to race, ethnicity, or socioeconomic status, in addition to gender. I argue that these two expansions of the debate can be fruitfully addressed together by engaging recent work on implicit bias, credibility assessments, and cultural norms about who has epistemic authority. Constructive forms of debate and argumentation can be implemented that encourage new voices, new topics, and new perspectives.

These discussions clearly have relevance beyond the disciplines of philosophy. I examine the role of adversarial argumentation in particular sciences (where this issue has been examined) and articulate the ways in which the debate in philosophy impacts practices of reasoning and debate in these other fields. Recent work on specific forms of discussion and argumentation in the sciences provide fruitful ground for exploring issues concerning argumentation and diversity.”

Author(s): Cordelia Sand

Title: The radical politics of quantum temporalities

Abstract: “Ever as scientific inquiry proceeds endlessly, knowledge practices themselves transform the world being studied. Carbon and quantum technologies rapidly unearth and re-Earth the biosphere; instruments (including the researchers themselves, and their social and political infrastructures) and their objects of study and innovation are, indeed, inseparable, intra-active phenomena. As instruments of twenty-first century scientific study rapidly morph the world originally being studied into an Other phenomena, foundational logics and disciplinary borders get challenged, demanding new and different interrogations and theories. One example is the emergence of the concept of response-ability across innovative work in the sciences, philosophy, the social sciences, and feminist theory.

Drawing on the work of two scientist-philosophers— particle-physicist and feminist Karen Barad, and neurobiologist-philosopher Francisco Varela— I engage the topological concept of the open interval as an epistemological model by which to map how embodied, non-linear temporalities enact meaning and sustain change. Both Barad and Varela locate ethicality in the spatial-temporal domain of materiality; for them, time cannot be thought outside of the political, they see response-ability and accountability as intrinsic to temporal flows. Taken together, their works provide a meeting

ground for biology and physics where quantum temporalities centrally inform an ethical, feminist post-human theory. Building on their thinking, I suggest that quantum temporalities dispel the conceptual category of ontology altogether, and that, politically, this is very good news for science and justice in the becoming of the planet. Ever as scientific inquiry proceeds endlessly, knowledge practices themselves transform the world being studied. Carbon and quantum technologies rapidly unearth and re-Earth the biosphere; instruments (including the researchers themselves, and their social and political infrastructures) and their objects of study and innovation are, indeed, inseparable, intra-active phenomena. As instruments of twenty-first century scientific study rapidly morph the world originally being studied into an Other phenomena, foundational logics and disciplinary borders get challenged, demanding new and different interrogations and theories. One example is the emergence of the concept of response-ability across innovative work in the sciences, philosophy, the social sciences, and feminist theory.

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Author(s): Heather Shattuck-Heidorn

Title: Human biology research and ethical, feminist methodology: A reflection on a dissertation

Abstract: “Conducting ethical human biology research requires active reflection on methodology, process, and assumptions. Human biologists, particularly those with evolutionary questions, often desire to work with populations that are non-contracepting, live in higher pathogen environments, or are energetically constrained. These characteristics are most typically found in remote populations that have not undergone epidemiological or market transitions. Researchers working in post-transition societies are frequently interested in questions involving disparities, such as how various social stressors, including poverty or discrimination, are related to biomarkers and disease risk. Across the field, scientists commonly choose research sites located in economically, socially, or politically marginalized communities. How do these research paradigms influence the research process, and how can human biology scientists best create ethical research projects? I root these questions in feminist science and science studies critiques, which have long offered a rich engagement with scientific epistemologies, methodologies, and process.

In this exploration of how feminist theory can inform human biology research, I critically reflect on the methodology and process of my dissertation research. This project was a nearly two year long research study in which I investigated immune and metabolic function in a population of Ecuadorian immigrants. In examining the successes and failures of this project, I explore the challenges in

creating feminist human biology research, particularly dissertation or early career projects. I also look to possible solutions to these challenges, and alternative research strategies, that may allow room for a scientific research process that more closely aligns with feminist epistemologies of science and ethical concerns.”

Author(s): Irem Kurtsal Steen

Title: Self-Determination in Plenitude

Abstract: “With their “argument from anthropocentrism” Hawthorne and Sider defend a liberal, “plenitudinous” ontology based on the possibility of rational people who recognize gerrymandered kinds of objects rather than our familiar kinds. Embracing this argument, I develop an ontology of persons and selves. Given the argument, members of different communities may correctly self-identify under different subject concepts, *person* being merely one subject concept. Furthermore, I argue, since a subject concept such as *person* is somewhat indeterminate as regards its spatiotemporal and modal boundaries, different individuals who fall under it are able to specify their own spatiotemporal and modal boundaries, thereby literally self-determining what they are. Thus, I defend that there is both intercommunity and individual variation in the individuation and persistence conditions of selves. I explain the ontology and the semantics of self-determination, and respond to objections about coincidence and arbitrariness.

While remaining squarely within contemporary realist analytic metaphysics, I go against one of its central assumptions, namely that all of us have the same essence and persistence conditions as each other, without room for social or individual variation. This view is feminist because it explains the mechanics for any individual to autonomously determine the kind of being that they are, their spatiotemporal boundaries, and what de re modal properties they have. At the same time, the view also explains how and in what sense what one is is socially determined. I intend this ontology to serve as a metaphysically robust backdrop for empirical and philosophical claims about social identity.”

Author(s): Heather Stewart

Title: Gatekeepers and “Deceivers”: Doubt, Denial, and Epistemic Injustice Towards Trans Patients in the Clinic

Abstract: In this paper, I extend the work of Miranda Fricker from her book, “Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing,” applying her analysis of epistemic injustice to a context and a group of people which she does not consider-- trans patients in health care settings. To this end, I argue that in light of their marginalized identities and social stereotypes held against them, trans individuals are at increased risk for having epistemic injustices directed at them in the clinic. I examine how Fricker’s concepts of testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice can both be applied to these experiences, but also offer some areas of critique to Fricker’s work. Specifically, I question whether Fricker’s individualistic virtue based approach to epistemic injustice will be strong enough to challenge the systemic nature of identity prejudices that give rise to this particular type of injustice and others, arguing instead for structural change that challenges how identities are

positioned in unequal and unjust ways in society. Through this analysis, I hope to extend and supplement Fricker's work by expanding it to scenarios which she did not consider.

Author(s): Rachel Stoiko

Title: To Be Announced

Author(s): Sari van Anders

Title: Hyperandrogenicity as the New Genital Parade: Policing Women in Sport, and the Role of a Feminist Scientist Expert Witness

Abstract: In this talk, I will discuss my position as a feminist scientist who (a) studies human testosterone, gender/sex, sexual diversity, and social behavior, and (b) served as an expert witness at the Court of Arbitration in Sport (CAS) for a female athlete contesting the Hyperandrogenicity Regulations developed by the International Association of Athletic Federations (IAAF). I will explore issues of language, terminology, and what ground is even contestable in sport adjudication, focusing on terms like "natural," "condition," "woman," "science," and "hyperandrogenicity." I will discuss the implications of viewing variations in testosterone via lenses of diversity, deviance, and/or disease. I will explore epistemological tensions in balancing competing knowledge claims between science and medicine in terms of scientific evidence related to testosterone in sport. I will point to various unresolved tensions, "ghosts," awkward surpluses, and epistemologies of ignorance related to the topic, including intersex, disorders/differences of sex development, transgender, innate sex differences related to physical ability and vulnerability, and, especially, the hyperandrogenicity regulations themselves (that are claimed to be about neither gender nor women). I will consider who is seen as objective in a case like this and what factors might have influenced the allotment of objectivity to various participants. Finally, I will discuss testosterone as cultural narrative vs. biomaterial substance, and the ways the two ought not to be "naturecultured" into one phenomenon but attended to as separable.

Author(s): Kelsey Waninger

Title: Creating a New World: Rhetoric and Technē in Feminist Science Fiction

Abstract: Certain areas of feminist scholarship have often identified the use of technology as a 'male monopoly' when it comes to creating power structures within historical and contemporary society. Taking this commentary to a literary platform, many feminist utopian/dystopian science-fiction writers and novelists turns this notion on its head. Instead of just reproducing the norm, they focus their narrative settings and characters within new worlds that are formed through the blend of technological advancement, ecological responsibility and the effacement of heteronormative gender dichotomies. Often regaled as social commentaries, feminist fiction, particularly speculative fiction within the feminist genre, involves reproducing a fictional clone of an official reality that implicitly addresses heteronormative 'nature' of that reality. This is often done through the theme of technē. Technē, when applied to a fictional world in a textual narrative, becomes a rhetorical force that allows for queer/non-heteronormative spaces to evolve. Looking particularly at Marge Piercy's 1976

novel, *Woman on the Edge of Time*, I hope to address how Piercy created a 22nd-century utopia, called Mattapoissett, through the application of “technē visions” within a female protagonist. Looking specifically at the way this genre uses technē as a rhetorical dynamic in its visual narrative, I hope to create a new space for the intersections of rhetorical and feminist theory.

Author(s): Sara Weaver, Carla Fehr

Title: Classic and Contemporary Feminist Critique: Values, Practices, and Metaphysical Assumptions in the Biological Sciences.

Abstract: “Harmful biological accounts of sex/gender continue to be produced and reproduced in scientific and public spheres. For instance, in 2001 Randy Thornhill and Craig Palmer suggested that human sexual assault is a facultative evolutionary reproductive strategy, and that to prevent it, men need only be educated about their evolutionary drives, and women should watch how they dress. Despite the intense criticism their theory received, to some, it remains a laudable account of sexual assault. Consider how in 2015 Canadian Chief of Defense General Tom Lawson when publicly commenting on the serious problem of sexual harassment in the Canadian military explained, ““It would be a trite answer, but it’s because we’re biologically wired in a certain way and there will be those who believe it is a reasonable thing to press themselves and their desires on others”” (CBC News 2015).

In this paper we focus on two categories of classic feminist critique. The first involves ways that gender stereotypes and cultural expectations influence biologists’ research questions, methods, and inferences. The second focuses on how a continued reliance on an essentialist/deterministic model of causation illegitimately prioritizes explanations of sex/gender that promote ideas of inherent and fixed differences between men and women. We demonstrate that these classic themes remain remarkably salient in contemporary neuroscience research and in what’s being called feminist evolutionary psychology. It is crucial therefore that we keep these valuable feminist discourses active. The biological sciences are regarded as an authority on human nature, what we are, and how we are different from/the same as one another. Classic work in feminist philosophy of biology continues to provide tools we can use to keep this authority in check.”

Author(s): Cassandra Wells

Title: When Science Met Justice: On the Ethics of Gendered Eligibility Policies in Sport

Abstract: Sex testing policies in elite organized sport have existed in some form since at least the 1940s, and have always generated debate not only about whether to officially screen and sort elite athletes into either the male or female competitive category, but also how it can best be accomplished. The recent sex testing controversies surrounding runners Caster Semenya and Dutee Chand, as well as recently revised transgender inclusion policies for international sport, demonstrate how these historical debates in sport are played out in contemporary times. Using these case examples, I argue in this paper that sex testing policies are able to endure repeated challenges to their legitimacy by creating points of conjugation between scientific evidence about male/female difference and socio-legal notions of “fairness” and “justice” in sport. I suggest that gendered

eligibility policies can only be undone if these conjugations are better scrutinized, understood, and disputed.

Author(s): Barbara L. Whitten

Title: The Entering Wedge: Sarah Frances Whiting and Physics at Wellesley College

Abstract: “Margaret Rossiter, in her monumental study of Women Scientists in America, called the first generation of women science teachers at the Seven Sisters colleges the “entering wedge”; by creating a supply of educated woman scientists, they forced the expansion of opportunities for women in science. In spite of their importance for the history of women in American science, these women are not well known because their work was in teaching and advising students. They were not active in research, and are not recognized by the research-oriented science community. Rescuing these early women scientists from obscurity is thus feminist work.

At Wellesley, the entering wedge in physics was created by Sarah Frances Whiting (1847-1927), who founded the physics and astronomy departments, designed the laboratories, bought the equipment, created the curriculum, and taught there for more than forty years. I’ll discuss her life and work, her students, and her place in women’s scientific history.”

Author(s): Angela Willey

Title: Undoing (Monogamy) with/in Neuroscience

Abstract: My talk approaches The Brain’s Body through her work on monogamy as a naturecultural object. Engaging closely with neuroscientific data and discourse and feminist and queer theorizations of embodiment and corporeality, she approaches these themes through explorations of the potential of a materialism grounded in the epistemological interventions of feminist and postcolonial science studies and queer historizations of sexuality. Her work offers a creative approach to the materiality of embodiment critically alert to the ways in which certain disciplinary ways of knowing have been constructed as less mediated access to that materiality than others. In a revaluation of marginalized body-knowledges, she has read Audre Lorde’s “Uses of the Erotic, The Erotic as Power” as a “biology of the erotic” to decenter assumptions about sexuality and human nature that shape the field of gene-brain-behavior research on affiliative behavior in general and on monogamy in particular. Through this reading she has elaborated a theory of “biopossibility” - the complexly mediated capacity to embody certain socially salient traits and “differences.” Here she explores how our collective efforts to reimagine neuroengaged body knowledges through the lens of critical theory might inform new conceptions of queer feminist biologies and science studies.

Author(s): Chloe Woggon

Title: On The Fringes Of Anthropology: Zora Neale Hurston, ‘Native’ Anthropologist

Abstract: My paper “On the Fringes of Anthropology: Zora Neale Hurston, ‘Native’ Anthropologist” seeks to examine the life of Zora Neale Hurston and her representation within the discipline of Anthropology. While her work today holds much importance for contemporary African-American

literary authors, such as Toni Morrison and Alice Walker, it has often been controversial, and her importance within Anthropology is still discussed and debated. Her position as a Black woman scholar in the 1920's meant much of the importance and necessity of her work was often determined by others, and her place within academia thus marginalized. This marginalization is still present today, some decades later. This paper seeks to clarify Hurston's position as an African-American woman within anthropology, in particular her essential role in shaping current ethnographic methods only recently gaining attention. Hurston used a self-reflexive ethnographic style and is recognized by many as being a forerunner to autoethnography, a style often attributed to those who came after her. Additionally, I hope to explore the ways in which she validated the African-American experience and culture, not only through her folkloric sharing and storytelling, but also through her use of certain literary techniques such as 'breaking out of the frame', allowing the narrator to begin speaking in the same manner as portrayed in the dialogue of her anthropological subjects. While Hurston was a prominent figure in the world of early American Anthropology, over the years her name has suffered severe marginalization, at times rarely being mentioned within the field. Zora Neale Hurston deserves recognition for what she accomplished, and this paper strives to expose the various ways social constructs such as gender, race, and ethnicity have made her vulnerable to academic and cultural disregard.

Author(s): Catherine A. Womack, Dan Hicks

Title: Does this study make me look fat? A critical examination of BMI categories, research, and public perception of weight

Abstract: "The term "obesity" is a clinical and epidemiological term in medicine and public health. Adults with a BMI of 30 or higher are considered obese, and determining BMI is a straightforward process. In scholarly, clinical, and popular discussions, ""obesity"" is often treated as a single, homogeneous BMI category. However, a closer look at obesity research suggests the need for a more complex account of the effects of body weight on potential adverse health outcomes.

In standard BMI division schemes, 18.5 is used as the threshold between ""underweight"" and ""normal weight,"" 25 as the upper threshold for ""normal weight,"" 30 as the upper threshold for "overweight", and categories of "obese" made in increments of 5 (e.g., 30, 35, 40). Researchers almost never work with a continuous, un-divided BMI variable or consider alternate division schemes (in terms of either the number of divisions or where thresholds are drawn). Further, some studies have found significant variation in associations between BMI and risk of death across sex, age, racial-ethnic, and socioeconomic groups.

In this paper, we examine the common division schemes of BMI categories and the effects of those division choices on research results, clinical recommendations and public perceptions of the relations between body weight and health. In an empirical section, we reproduce and extend the analyses of a few high-profile papers on the health effects of obesity. We then examine some clinical and social effects of alternative categorizations of BMI, as well as interactions on the findings of those studies. In a political climate where reactions to obesity swing between moral panic and denial, more nuanced, accurate and informative weight and health-related categories may better serve patients, clinicians and policy makers. We provide a methodological impetus for moving in that direction. "

Author(s): Lauren Woomer

Title: Hold space for the community²: Lessons in testimonial (in)competence from Chicago activists

Abstract: “On March 17, 2016 the Chicago Police Board held one of its monthly meetings during which the public is invited to raise concerns about police (mis)conduct. Young black activists took over this meeting in order to hold a forum at which community members affected by police violence were invited to air their grievances to the activists and other members of the black community rather than to the Police Board. One justification given for this shift in the hearer of the community’s grievances was that the Board does not care about black people or about the families affected by police violence, and does not actually want to hear the testimony being given by these groups.

One thing that the activists are doing at this protest, I argue, is accusing the Police Board of not being competent hearers of the testimony of Chicago’s black community. However, rather than telling the black community to simply withhold that testimony from the Board, they are providing themselves as alternative competent hearers to receive that testimony. In this paper I will examine what we can learn about what it means to be a competent hearer of testimony from this incident. First, I will examine what these activists take to be the criteria for being a competent hearer of testimony, including that one has to care about the people speaking. I will then examine whether these criteria are general criteria for being a competent hearer in all testimonial exchanges, or only in certain special cases. Finally, I will examine the reaction of the Police Board to the protest, and propose what this reaction should have been if they were to work toward being more competent hearers of this kind of testimony in the future.”